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1. INTRODUCTION
"As a pastor, God trusts you with the spiritual guidance of His people
and the handling of His money." - Dave RamseyI
Why would a church, synagogue, or religious school seek to reorganize
under the Bankruptcy Code? What do their filings reveal about the use and
effectiveness of Chapter 11? Before a string of Roman Catholic dioceses
sought bankruptcy protection to handle litigation stemming from sexual abuse
allegations,2 the notion of religious organizations filing for bankruptcy per-
haps seemed unfathomable.4 Nonetheless, between 2006 and 2011, faith-
based institutions located throughout the United States filed over 500 peti-
tions under Chapter 11.5
One of the most publicized filings was that of Crystal Cathedral Minis-
tries,6 the home of the internationally-distributed televangelist show and
1. Real Debt Help: Get Out of Debt With Dave Ramsey's Total Money Makeo-
ver Plan, DAVERAMSEY.COM, http://www.daveramsey.com/homepage/church/ (last
visited Nov. 29, 2012).
2. Between 2004 and 2012, eight dioceses, the Oregon Province of the Jesuits,
and the Congregation of the Christian Brothers filed under Chapter 11. Information
about all ten cases is available at Bankruptcy Protection and the Sexual Abuse Crisis,
BISHOPACCOUNTABILITY.COM, http://www.bishop-accountability.org/bankruptcy.htm
(last visited Nov. 28, 2012). See also Jonathan C. Lipson, When Churches Fail: The
Diocesan Debtor Dilemmas, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 363, 363-66 (2006) (discussing what
benefits reorganization under Chapter 11 might bring to the dioceses); David A.
Skeel, Jr., Avoiding Moral Bankruptcy, 44 B.C. L. REV. 1181, 1181-83 (2003) (noting
that the diocese bankruptcies represent an effort to centralize litigation and that finan-
cial issues are secondary in these cases).
3. 1 use terms such as "faith-based organization," "religious institution," "reli-
gious organization," and "religious entity" to mean any organization whose operations
are motivated in a meaningful way by religious beliefs and principles. Previously
religiously affiliated organizations, such as Goodwill Industries, are not included by
my definition.
4. See, e.g., Skeel, supra note 2, at 1181 ("[T]he rumors that the Archdiocese
[of Boston] was considering filing for bankruptcy took me - and I suspect most bank-
ruptcy scholars - completely by surprise. It had never dawned on me that a religious
organization would ever file for bankruptcy.").
5. Chapter 11 provides for the reorganization of a business, though it also is
available to natural persons and can be used to effect liquidation. 11 U.S.C. § 101(41)
(2012). Religious organizations are eligible to file under Chapter 11 as "people." Id
§ 109(d). See infra Part II.A for a discussion of the methodology used to identify
these petitions and create the dataset on which this Article relies.
6. Chapter 11 Voluntary Petition, In re Crystal Cathedral Ministries, No. 8:10-
bk-24771 RK (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2010) [hereinafter Voluntary Petition]; see
also Crystal Cathedral Megachurch Files for Bankruptcy, USA TODAY (Oct. 19,
2010, 10:11 AM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/religion/2010-10-20-
crystal 19_STN.htm; Amy Taxin, Crystal Cathedral Bankruptcy: Megachurch Files
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North America's longest running televised church service "Hour of Power."7
Crystal Cathedral Ministries' road to bankruptcy began with the retirement of
its founder.8 The replacement pastor resigned after three unsettling years
during which the church experienced unrest and member attrition.9 Through-
out these years, the economic downturn also took its toll, and between 2008
and 2010 Crystal Cathedral Ministries' gross revenue plummeted from almost
$55 million to below $25 million.'0 By the time it filed under Chapter 11,
nearly a dozen creditors had instigated lawsuits against it for unpaid debts."
However, Catholic dioceses and megachurches are not the only religious
institutions seeking to reorganize.' 2 Instead, they are the minority.13 This
Article presents the results of a comprehensive empirical study of faith-based
organizations that filed under Chapter 11 from the beginning of 2006 to the
end of 2011, culled from a review of over 60,000 bankruptcy petitions.' 4
This Article examines the institutions' characteristics, reasons for filing,
and case outcomes to investigate what benefits Chapter II brings to the or-
ganizations and whether bankruptcy is an effective solution to their financial
problems. Based on the successful reorganizations and continued operations
of some of the debtors in the study, it finds that Chapter 11 has the potential
to provide a productive means for addressing their financial problems by of-
fering religious organizations an avenue to rehabilitate their operations fol-
lowing economic downturns, failures and transitions in leadership, and stand-
stills in negotiating with creditors.' 5 In exploring these Chapter 11 cases, this
Article not only reveals the previously unreported prevalence of religious
organizations' bankruptcies,' 6 but it also adds to only recently developing
For Chapter II, HUFFINGTON PosT (Oct. 18, 2010, 10:11 PM), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/10/1 8/crystal-cathedral-bankrupn 767219.html.
7. See Disclosure Statement Describing First Amended Chapter 11 Plan Filed
by Committee of Creditors Holding Unsecured Claims, Crystal Cathedral, No. 8:10-
bk-24711 RK, 2011 WL 6916863 [hereinafter First Amended Chapter 11 Plan].
8. See Disclosure Statement Describing Amended Chapter 11 Plan Filed by
Committee of Creditors Holding Unsecured Claims, Crystal Cathedral, No. 8:10-bk-
24711 RK, 2011 WL 6916858 [hereinafter Chapter 11 Plan].
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.; Debtor's Disclosure Statement Describing Chapter 11 Plan of Reorgani-
zation, Crystal Cathedral, Ch. 11 No. 8:10-bk-2471 1 RK, 2011 WL 6916851 (Trial
Filing) [hereinafter Debtor's Disclosure Statement].
12. See infra Part II.A.
13. See infra Part ll.A.
14. See infra Part II.A.
15. See infra Part IV.
16. This is the first article to focus on religious organizations filing for bankrupt-
cy that are not Catholic dioceses or megachurches. See generally, e.g., Lipson, supra
note 2 (discussing the Catholic dioceses' bankruptcy cases); Skeel, supra note 2
(same); Andrew Stone Mayo, Comment, For God and Money: The Place of the Meg-
7212013]
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scholarly discussions of nonprofit bankruptcies,17 providing groundwork for
future consideration of the Code's application to nonprofit entities.
Further, drawing upon the religious organization cases, the Article re-
sponds to two broader debates about Chapter 11: the role of bankruptcy
courts in adjudicating these cases, and the broad purposes of business reor-
ganization. As to the former, an assessment of the religious organization
cases parallels recent studies suggesting that Chapter 11 is not an inefficient
method for addressing the financial problems of corporations.19 The review
additionally shows that a greater percentage of debtors confirm and consum-
mate plans or otherwise benefit from Chapter 11 than historically thought. 2 0
As to the latter, in considering whether the religious organization cases focus
achurch Within the Bankruptcy Code, 27 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 609 (2011) (discuss-
ing how the Bankruptcy Code applies to megachurches).
17. This Article also is one of the first articles to address nonprofit entities filing
for bankruptcy and the uniqueness of their cases. See, e.g., Pamela Foohey, Chapter
II Reorganization and the Fair and Equitable Standard: How the Absolute Priority
Rule Applies to All Nonprofit Entities, 86 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 31, 32-33 (2012) (noting
that historically very few nonprofit entities sought bankruptcy protection, and though
the Code does not prevent them from filing, Chapter 11 "was designed for and is
predominately applied to for-profit entities' structure and business objectives"); Reid
K. Weisbord, Charitable Insolvency and Corporate Governance in Bankruptcy Reor-
ganization 2 n.2 (Berkely Sch. of Law Bus. Law Journal, Working Paper No. 2,
2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-2188940 (noting that legal scholarship on
nonprofit bankruptcy is scarce and that most scholarship discusses these bankruptcies
in discrete contexts, such as the bankruptcies of nonprofit health systems).
18. For example, the Code provides that involuntary petitions may not be filed
against nonprofit entities and that nonprofit entities' Chapter 11 cases may not be
converted to Chapter 7 cases without their consent. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 303(a), 1112(c)
(2012); see also Foohey, supra note 17, at 36-37 (discussing why courts hold that the
absolute priority rule does not apply to nonprofits entities and how this holding affects
nonprofit reorganization cases). The data presented in this Article, along with future
empirical studies of nonprofits entities' bankruptcy cases, may suggest a need to re-
consider these and other Code provisions.
19. See Edward R. Morrison, Bankruptcy Decision Making: An Empirical Study
of Continuation Bias in Small-Business Bankruptcies, 50 J.L. & EcON. 381, 381-83
(2007) [hereinafter Bankruptcy Decision Making] (finding that continuation bias
"allowing failing businesses to linger under the protection of the court, which resists
liquidation even when it is optimal" is "either absent or empirically unimportant"
based on a sample of Chapter 11 cases filed by small businesses); Elizabeth Warren &
Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Success of Chapter 11: A Challenge to the Critics, 107
MICH. L. REV. 603, 604-06 (2009) [hereinafter Success of Chapter 11] ("These data
show that much of the conventional wisdom about key elements of Chapter 11 is
simply wrong. Contrary to so many assertions, Chapter 11 has been far more success-
ful than supposed."); infra Part Ill.A.
20. See infra Part Ill.B.
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more on preserving going-concern value21 or keeping owner-operators and
their small businesses together, the analysis reveals that the cases straddle
these two accounts of Chapter 11, thereby identifying a set of cases that im-
22plicate multiple theories of business reorganization.
For example, Ark of Safety Apostolic Faith Temple's (Ark of Safety)
story encompasses many of the problems that the religious organizations in
21. Going-concern value is the difference between the liquidation value of a
debtor and value of the business if it continues operating. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595,
pt. 2, at 223 (1977).
22. See Douglas G. Baird & Edward R. Morrison, Serial Entrepreneurs and
Small Business Bankruptcies, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2310, 2311-14 (2005) (summariz-
ing the going-concern account and positing that the focal point should be on the en-
trepreneur rather than the corporate entity in small business cases). In addition, focus-
ing on the ex ante rather than ex post effects of bankruptcy law, others have argued
that bankruptcy may serve to induce entrepreneurial risk taking by providing a "safety
net," thereby driving economic growth. See Ralph Brubaker, Artificial Impairment
and the Single-Asset Real Estate Debtor, 33 No. 4 Bankruptcy Law Letter 1, 8 (April
2013) (citing studies and noting further that "historically, [this ability of bankruptcy to
encourage entrepreneurialism] seems to have been one of the principle justifications
for bankruptcy law, widely perceived and acknowledged as such").
Other approaches to Chapter 11 also focus on goals beyond preserving go-
ing-concern value. See, e.g., KAREN GROSS, FAILURE AND FORGIVENESS: RE-
BALANCING THE BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM 248-49 (1997); Charles J. Tabb, The Future of
Chapter 11, 44 S.C. L. REV. 791, 802-07 (1993); Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Poli-
cy, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 776-77 (1987). However, these approaches similarly
focus on preserving the business. See Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook,
Contracting Out of Bankruptcy: An Empirical Intervention, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1197,
1214-15 (2005) [hereinafter Contracting Out of Bankruptcy] (summarizing theories of
"bargained bankruptcy" and arguing that empirical evidence demonstrates that bank-
ruptcy brings together a host of "social and economic relationships" and thus cannot
be reduced to a "two-party contract model" without a loss of efficiency). In contrast,
the opposing main account of Chapter 11, termed the creditors' bargain theory, is that
it serves to maximize the value of assets for creditors and shareholders. See general-
ly, e.g., THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW (1986);
Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors'
Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857 (1982) (setting forth the "simple creditors' bargain model;
Thomas H. Jackson & Robert E. Scott, On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay on
Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditors' Bargain, 75 VA. L. REV. 155 (1989) (creating
an "expanded creditors' bargain model"); Lynn M. LoPucki, A Team Production
Theory of Bankruptcy Reorganization, 57 VAND. L. REV. 741 (2004) (positing a
"team production theory" of bankruptcy reorganization and contrasting it with the
creditors' bargain theory).
The differences between the focus of the going-concern value account and
related accounts and the focus of the entrepreneurial accounts as they apply to reli-
gious organization debtors are the focus of this Article. In particular, the view of
Chapter 11 presented in this Article through the cases of religious organization debt-
ors draws upon and is an extension of the insights of Professors Baird and Morrison
in Serial Entrepreneurs and Small Business Bankruptcies.
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this study faced before filing. Formed in 1998 by Bishop Herman Jackson,
Ark of Safety offered spiritual services and community outreach to the resi-
dents of Cicero, Illinois, a town ten miles west of Chicago.23 Bishop Jackson
held the church's first worship service in a small storefront.24 The ministry
grew and relocated to a 24,000 square foot building, purchased and owned by
the church as a nonprofit corporation. 25 When Bishop Jackson divorced in
2008, "confusion and devastation" ensued, forming a gap within the church
administration.26 This resulted in decreased attendance and a significant por-
tion of the members leaving the ministry. 27 Though many members stayed
committed to Bishop Jackson and the congregation,28 the souring economy
led to layoffs, leaving many remaining parishioners unable to donate as much
as they had in the past.29 The economy further affected the church's financial
condition when its daycare tenant abruptly ended its lease. 30 This added to
the reduction in Ark of Safety's revenues and led to even more member attri-
tion as families with children enrolled in the defunct daycare also left the
church.3 ' Ark of Safety struggled to find a new daycare tenant; once it did, it
took more than a year before the new tenant could secure the required
operating licenses. 32
By early 2010, Ark of Safety could no longer remain current on its fi-
nancial obligations.33 Most distressing was its inability to pay the $1 million
mortgage on its church building valued at $1.2 million. 34 Otherwise, it owed
about $150,000 to unsecured creditors, and owned a church organ, pews,
furniture, and equipment housed in the church, which collectively were val-
ued at under $20,000." The church filed a Chapter 11 petition with the stated
36hope of restructuring its mortgage.
23. See Disclosure Statement, In re Ark of Safety Apostolic Faith Temple, Inc.,
No. 09-31025 (Bankr. N.D. III. Aug. 24, 2009), Doc. 32.
24. Biographies, ARK OF SAFETY APOSTOLIC FAITH TEMPLE, http://www. arkof-
safety.co/Biographies.html (last visited Aug. 28, 2013).
25. See Disclosure Statement, supra note 23, at Doc. 32; Biographies, supra
note 24.
26. Disclosure Statement, supra note 23, at Doc. 32.
27. Id.
28. 1 use the term congregation to mean a group of individuals - collectively, the
congregation's members or the congregants - who meet together regularly for reli-
gious worship.
29. See Disclosure Statement, supra note 23, at Doc. 32.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
3 6. Id.
724 [Vol. 78
BANKRUPTING THE FAITH
Supported by its remaining members' continued faith in Bishop Jackson
and the congregation, a paying daycare tenant, two new renters of its sanctu-
ary space, and its administration's agreement to forgo their salaries for a year,
Ark of Safety obtained confirmation of its reorganization plan, which mainly
restructured the payments on its mortgage. 37 As of February 2013, it contin-
ued to operate in the same building.
Like Crystal Cathedral Ministries and Ark of Safety, the faith-based in-
stitutions that file under Chapter 11 predominately operate places of wor-
ship.39 Some run schools, and others operate food pantries, daycares, and
halfway houses in addition to their places of worship.40 The filing entities
span Christian denominations, and include Jewish, Buddhist, Hindu, and Is-
41lamic institutions. Overall, they reflect the religious makeup of Americans,
although certain Christian denominations are overrepresented in comparison
to congregations nationwide. 42
Though religious in character, many of the organizations exhibit the
hallmarks and financial vulnerabilities of small businesses, which lead them
to bankruptcy.43 One of their greatest vulnerabilities stems from their affilia-
tions. The denominations overrepresented in Chapter 11 generally are those
with governing bodies that may not be able to offer financial support in times
of need, such as the Reformed Church in America with which Crystal Cathe-
37. Id.; Order Confirming Chapter 11 Plan, In re Ark of Safety Apostolic Faith
Temple, Inc., No. 09-31025 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. May 11, 2010), Doc. 55.
38. See ARK OF SAFETY APOSTOLIC FAITH TEMPLE, http://www.arkofsafety.
co/default.html (last visited Aug. 28, 2013).
39. See infra Table 2.
40. See infra Table 2.
41. See infra Table 2 and note 97.
42. See infra Part II.B.
43. "Small business" is an imprecise term. Scholars generally have divided
cases and debtors into "small" and "large" groups based on total assets or debts, or
whether the company was publicly traded. Stephen J. Lubben, The Types of Chapter
II Cases, 84 AM. BANKR. L.J. 233, 233 (2010); see also Brian A. Blum, The Goals
and Process of Reorganizing Small Businesses in Bankruptcy, 4 J. SMALL &
EMERGING Bus. L. 181, 188-93 (2000) (discussing different ideas of what constitutes
a small business). "Small" also is defined based on number of employees or average
annual revenue. See Baird & Morrison, supra note 22, at 2316 n.25. The Bankruptcy
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat.
23 [hereinafter BAPCPA], added a definition to the Bankruptcy Code that provides
that a "small business debtor" is a debtor with "aggregate noncontingent liquidated
secured and unsecured debts" as of the petition date not exceeding $2 million, which
is adjusted on 3-year intervals (and here adjusted effective April 2010, $2,343,300).
11 U.S.C. §§ 101(51D), 10 (2012). A leading prior legislative recommendation pro-
posed defining a small business debtor as one with less than $5 million in liquidated
and noncontingent debt. See NATIONAL BANKR. REVIEW COMM'N, BANKRUPTCY:
THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS 618 (Oct. 20, 1997), available at http://govinfo.li-
brary.unt.edu/nbrc/report/1 5smalbu.pdf (last visited Aug. 28, 2013).
2013] 725
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dral Ministries is affiliated." Likewise, the faith-based institutions in this
study do not have other religious organizations to turn to for financial help
when they encounter problems paying their debts.45
The data show that the vast majority of religious organizations that file
under Chapter 11 do so because of concerns about paying mortgages on real
property.46 They seek to reorganize primarily so that they may restructure
their mortgage payments and retain their real property. 47 Like Ark of Safety,
they arrive in bankruptcy court holding almost all of the value of their assets
in real property and owing almost all of their debts on that real property.48
They tend to own buildings worth more than the debts securing them, indicat-
49ing that there may be value to be saved. 4 Similarly, they have operated for a
relatively long time under the leadership of a key pastor or reverend.50 In
fact, most of the organizations were formed two decades or more prior to
their bankruptcies, suggesting that relatively stable congregations are using
reorganization to preserve not only a building, but also an established com-
munity invested in continuing to assemble in the particular building viewed
as their spiritual home. 5'
44. See History, SHEPHERD'S GROVE, http://www.shepherdsgrove.org/about/
history.php (last visited Aug. 28, 2013) (As of July 7, 2013, Crystal Cathedral Minis-
tries had been purchased by the Orange County, CA Diocese of the Roman Catholic
church and renamed "Shepherd's Grove.").
45. See infra Part II.B. This organizational structure may raise questions and
lead to future inquiries regarding the "theory of the firm" as it applies to religious
institutions and, by extension, nonprofit entities. See, e.g., Brooks B. Hull & Freder-
ick Bold, Towards an Economic Theory of the Church, 16 INT'L. J. OF Soc.
EcoNOMics 5 (1989) (employing the theory of the firm to explain behavior of church-
es); Usha Rodrigues, Entity and Identity, 60 EMORY L.J. 1257, 1273-79, 1313 (2011)
(surveying existing theories of the firm and nonprofit entities, arguing that these theo-
ries do not explain fully the existence of nonprofits, and setting forth a "social identity
theory of the nonprofit"). Because this Article primarily seeks to explore the Chapter
I1 cases of religious organizations as to their productivity and how they inform de-
bates about the efficiency and theories of Chapter 11, it does not take up this inquiry
further. Nonetheless, applying the results of this study to theories of religious institu-
tion and nonprofit organizational structures may be an interesting and useful future
extension of this Article.
46. See infra Part II.B.
47. See infra note 196 and accompanying text.
48. See infra Table 3. Crystal Cathedral Ministries similarly arrived in bank-
ruptcy court holding a majority of its assets in real property and owing a majority of
its debts on that real property. See Debtor's Disclosure Statement, supra note 11.
However, because it owed significant unsecured debts, it owed proportionally less of
its debts on real property than other religious organizations in this study. See id
Nonetheless, it too filed to save its real property. See id.
49. See infra Part II.B.
50. See sources cited supra note 6.
51. See infra Parts II.B, IV.C.
726 [Vol. 78
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Filing to save encumbered property or keep a congregation together,
however, is merely a symptom of underlying problems. The more interesting
and significant story of religious organization cases is how the institutions
came to need bankruptcy protection. Two primary precipitators emerge from
52their cases. Unsurprisingly, as evident in Crystal Cathedral Ministries' and
Ark of Safety's situations, the first is the Great Recession and its effect on
income, jobs, and secured lending.53 As incomes declined and jobs disap-
peared, congregants could not give as much to their churches, and as the mar-
ket for secured lending tightened, banks were unwilling to refinance mort-
gages.54 Further, as with Ark of Safety, some religious organizations lost
even more revenue when tenants renting space in their church buildings end-
ed leases or simply did not pay.55
The second is the more intriguing precipitator. An investigation of their
cases indicates that these institutions are driven by and dependent on their
leaders. 6 When leaders make poor business (or life) decisions, move away,
or die, congregants lose faith, move with them, or abandon the religious
community.57 Poor leadership also is evident in both Crystal Cathedral Min-
58istries' and Ark of Safety's stories.
In the wake of destabilizing events, the remaining leaders and congre-
gants must pick up the pieces.59 Across both stories, the ultimate goal is to
keep the congregation alive, allowing members to continue to worship and
attend daycare and school in the same physical space they have worked hard
60to afford and construct and have gathered in for years. In some instances,
the congregation's continuation also permits a pastor to retain his ministry.
Further, this examination of the causes and outcomes of the religious or-
ganizations' bankruptcy cases reveals that their cases connect with multiple
theories of the purposes of Chapter 11. As noted, one of the primary accounts
of Chapter 11 is that reorganization and sales preserve going-concern value of
financially-distressed businesses. 62 Relating to this account, in empirically
studying Chapter 11, scholars have concentrated on large, publicly-traded
52. See infra Part IV.
53. Debtor's Disclosure Statement, supra note 11; Disclosure Statement, supra
note 23, at 3.
54. Debtor's Disclosure Statement, supra note 11; Disclosure Statement, supra
note 23, at 3.
55. Disclosure Statement, supra note 23, at 3.
56. See infra Part IV.B.
57. See infra Part IV.B.
58. Debtor's Disclosure Statement, supra note 11; Disclosure Statement, supra
note 23, at 3.
59. See infra Part IV.B.
60. See infra Part IV.C.
61. See infra Part IV.C.
62. See Baird & Morrison, supra note 22, at 2312-14 (summarizing the standard
account).
2013] 727
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companies or certain issues, such as professional fees.6 3 Relatively recently,
more attention has been directed to the cases of small business debtors.&6
Notably, drawing on a dataset of Chapter 11 filings in the Bankruptcy Court
for the Northern District of Illinois during 1998 (the Baird-Morrison study),
Professors Douglas Baird and Edward Morrison posit a conception of small
business reorganization as primarily retarding entrepreneurs' re-deployment
of their human capital by encouraging entrepreneurs to continue operating
their current business entities rather than dissolving those entities and starting
anew. Contrary to the primary account, they emphasize that primary focus
should be on the entrepreneur running the business.
The religious organization cases in this study contain elements of both
these accounts. The data show that even those institutions that file in reaction
63. See, e.g., LYNN M. LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE: How COMPETITION FOR
BIG CASES IS CORRUPTING THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS (2005) (examining the Chapter
11 reorganization process in bankruptcy courts that historically handle most of the
largest bankruptcy cases); LYNN M. LOPUCKI & JOSEPH W. DOHERTY, PROFESSIONAL
FEES IN CORPORATE BANKRUPTCIES: DATA, ANALYSIS, AND EVALUATION (2011) (ex-
amining the professional fees based on court files in 102 of the largest bankruptcy
cases); Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Financial Characteristics of
Businesses in Bankruptcy, 73 AM. BANKR. L. J. 499, 506-07 (1999) [hereinafter Fi-
nancial Characteristics] (summarizing studies of business bankruptcy from the 1960s
through the 1990s); see also Robert M. Lawless et. al, A Glimpse at Professional Fees
and Other Direct Costs in Small Firm Bankruptcies, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 847, 848-49
(noting that many studies that include smaller companies rely on data from bankrupt-
cies filed prior to the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code).
64. See, e.g., Baird & Morrison, supra note 22, at 2310 (studying businesses that
filed under Chapter II in one bankruptcy court over one year and focusing on small
business bankruptcies); Bankruptcy Decision Making, supra note 19, at 381 (examin-
ing the shutdown decision of small businesses in a sample of Chapter 11 cases filed in
one bankruptcy court over one year); Edward R. Morrison, Bargaining Around Bank-
ruptcy: Small Business Workouts and State Law, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 255 (2009) (ex-
amining when distressed small businesses opt to file for bankruptcy rather than liqui-
date under state law based on distressed businesses located in Cook County, Illinois);
Teresa Sullivan et. al, FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES OF SMALL BUSINESSES AND REASONS
FOR THEIR FAILURE (1998), available at http://archive.sba.gov/advo/research/
rsl88tot.pdf (reporting on the bankruptcies of small businesses filed in 1994); Success
of Chapter 11, supra note 19 (examining Chapter 11 cases filed in 1994 and 2002
across several jurisdictions and positing that BAPCPA's amendments to Chapter 11
may be detrimental to small business debtors).
65. Baird & Morrison, supra note 22, at 2311-12.
66. Id. at 2366. Scholars previously have identified and discussed the depend-
ence of small businesses on their owner-operators. See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki,
The Debtor in Full Control - Systems Failure Under Chapter II of the Bankruptcy
Code? Second Installment, 57 AM. BANKR. L.J. 247, 263-66 (1983) [hereinafter
Systems Failure Part 2] (noting that "[t]here is a broad consensus among students
of business failure that the large majority of businesses which fail do so because of
poor management").
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to the economic downturn are dependent on the overarching management of a
leader, like Bishop Jackson.67 Otherwise, they generally rise or fall with
leaders who energize their congregations. The benefits they seek from
Chapter 11 mirror some of the reasons other small businesses file. They want
some breathing space from creditors while they assess their operations; 69 they
no longer can meet their creditors' demands and seek a stay of collection
activities;70 and they hope to change negotiating dynamics with secured credi-
tors that are refusing to bargain with leadership.7'
Thus, the religious organizations enter Chapter 11 with significant assets
and reorganization prospects that potentially make the process valuable to
72them and their creditors. Particular attention should be directed to the lead-
ers' abilities to marshal their organizations through the turmoil that led to
bankruptcy, but consideration also must be given to the continuation pro-
spects of the congregation that makes up the religious entity that owns the
property. Both approaches are critical, and using them in combination is
fundamental to assessing religious institutions' reorganizations.74
Part 11 describes the methodology and dataset, provides an overview of
the affiliations, operations, and financial characteristics of the religious or-
67. See infra Part IV.A.
68. See infra Part IV.B.
69. The going-concern account explains this breathing space as benefitting the
corporate debtor, while the small business account stresses that the value of breathing
space accrues to the entrepreneur herself. Compare A. Mechele Dickerson, The Many
Faces of Chapter 11: A Reply to Professor Baird, 12 AM. BANKR. L.J. 209, 116 n.42
(2004), with Baird & Morrison, supra note 22, at 2315 n.22. To the extent a religious
organization's survival is contingent on its leader, bankruptcy may afford them time
to integrate a new leader into the organization. In this way, the breathing space may
benefit the corporate debtor. On the other hand, bankruptcy may afford an existing
pastor time to realign a congregation's activities with its finances and priorities.
Though the organization benefits, the pastor may benefit more.
70. The automatic stay generally suspends debt service and creditors' collection
activities. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2012).
71. See Baird & Morrison, supra note 22, at 2315-16 (summarizing the benefits
that entrepreneurs may receive from Chapter 11).
72. See infra Part IV.C.
73. See infra Part V.
74. Professors Baird and Morrison recognize that small business cases may exist
in which the business may be worth saving because of the value of specialized assets,
and identify restaurants as one industry prone to the accumulation of specialized as-
sets. See Baird & Morrison, supra note 22, at 2345-46. However, they note that the
restaurant debtors in their sample used Chapter 11 successfully and beneficially not
because they preserved these assets, but because the skills of the owner-operator were
matched to the enterprise. Id. at 2345-49. They ultimately conclude that in the vast
majority of cases there is no business worth saving. Id. at 2366. The view of Chapter
11 presented in this Article through the cases of religious organization debtors is an
extension of their work, not an entirely new view of Chapter 11. See infra Part V.
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ganization debtors, and contrasts these characteristics with those of other
small business debtors. Parts III and IV focus on the cases. Part III traces
their procedural histories and outcomes to evaluate the workings of bankrupt-
cy courts. Part IV highlights the most prevalent stories of the religious organ-
izations in this study, and then considers how Chapter 11 aided them and
whether reorganization offered an effective solution to their financial prob-
lems. Expanding on the usefulness of reorganization to faith-based institu-
tions, Part V explores what the cases reveal about business bankruptcies. Part
VI concludes with suggestions for further research into and conceptualiza-
tions of business reorganization.
II. IDENTIFYING RELIGIOUS BANKRUPTCIES
A. Methodology and Data75
The data for this Article comes from the case files of bankruptcy courts
across the country as available via the Public Access to Court Electronic Rec-
ords (PACER) service. Because there is no reliable method to pinpoint reli-
gious organizations from the identification data debtors submit to bankruptcy
courts as part of filing under the Bankruptcy Code, to isolate these entities I
reviewed the petitioner's name of each of the over 60,000 entities or individ-
uals that filed under Chapter 11 in every bankruptcy court in the fifty United
States and the District of Columbia from January 1, 2006, to December 31,
2011.76 Based on the petitioners' names, I first assembled a pool of petitions
75. The study involves a dataset of 497 cases. This dataset is on file with
the author.
76. Religious congregations (for instance, churches, synagogues, mosques) that
meet the requirements of 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) automatically are considered tax-
exempt under the Internal Revenue Code; other religious organizations generally must
apply to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) for tax-exempt status. Tax Guide for
Churches and Religious Organizations, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, 3, available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p I 828.pdf. Conceptually, all faith-based organizations
that file under Chapter 11 are nonprofit and/or tax-exempt organizations qualified
under § 501 (c)(3) and should identify themselves as such on the face sheet of their
voluntary petitions. This listing thus could serve as an initial identification method.
Relatedly, almost all of the petitioners identified themselves as corporations on their
petitions or were incorporated at the time of their filings as evident by their names as
stated on their petitions (95.9% of the petitions; another 1.9% reported "other," but
identified themselves as nonprofit organizations). It seems logical to assume that
almost all of the petitioners would list themselves as nonprofit or tax-exempt organi-
zations. Nonetheless, only 66.3% of the entities identified themselves as such. Ac-
cordingly, using the nonprofit or tax-exempt organization identification on the volun-
tary petition would yield an incomplete and potentially biased list of debtors. In the
context of identifying business bankruptcies, scholars have relied on the petitioner's
name to sort business Chapter 11 cases from individual Chapter 11 cases. See, e.g.,
Success of Chapter 11, supra note 19, at 609 (relying on the name in the case title to
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that possibly were those of faith-based organizations. The pool included cas-
es in which: (1) the petitioner's name included words generally associated
with religion, such as church, worship, ministry, Christian, covenant, or tem-
ple; or (2) the petitioner's name included words generally associated with
nonprofits, such as freedom, community, love, care, and society. I eliminated
cases of petitioners with the names of individuals, and with names generally
associated with for-profit businesses, such as consulting, development, enter-
prises, properties, realty, and trucking. 77 From the resulting list of possible
faith-based institutions, I reviewed documents filed in each case to determine
78
whether the petitioner actually was a religious organization.
After combining jointly administered cases, I identified a total of 516
cases and 473 unique religious organization debtors spanning the study's six-
year timeframe. 79 I removed nineteen of these cases from the dataset, includ-
ing seven cases filed by Catholic dioceses and related entities. These cases
stem from sex abuse allegations and ultimately represent an effort to handle
identify cases); Financial Characteristics, supra note 63, at 512 (detailing criteria
for determining a case to be a business bankruptcy and partially relying on the
petitioner's name).
77. 1 reviewed the petitioners' names three times to verify that I had identified as
many of the potentially relevant filings as possible. The initial list of all Chapter 11
cases filed between January 1, 2006, and December 31, 2011, was based on two
downloads from PACER of petitions filed in every bankruptcy court in the United
States and the District of Columbia. In September 2011, 1 downloaded a list of all
Chapter 11 petitions filed between January 1, 2006, and June 30, 2011, and in March
2012, 1 downloaded a list of all Chapter 11 petitions filed between July 1, 2011, and
December 31, 2011. Because of PACER's capabilities, it is unclear whether the exact
same list of Chapter 11 petitions will be created if a search of all Chapter 11 petitions
filed in these jurisdictions during the study's timeframe was run at this time. The
Administrative Office of the United States Courts (AO) reported 61,260 Chapter 11
cases filed in these jurisdictions during the study's timeframe, including Chapter II
cases involving predominately non-business debt. Bankruptcy Statistics, UNITED
STATES COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/BankruptcyStatistics.aspx (last
visited Aug. 29, 2013).
78. If I had difficulty determining the nature of the organization, I retained it in
the sample if the debtor identified itself as a nonprofit organization on its petition or if
the word church, worship, ministry, Christian, or similar appeared in its name. In
some instances, I performed an Internet search to research the nature of the organiza-
tion. The objective of this identification process was to minimize any of my judg-
ments that could introduce bias into the dataset.
79. For example, the cases of nine entities related to Saint Vincent Catholic
Medical Center in New York were jointly administered. See Order Granting Motion
for Joint Administration, In re Saint Vincents Catholic Medical Centers of New York,
No. 10-11963 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2010). Thirty-seven organizations filed
twice, and three filed three times over the study's timeframe. See supra note 75.
Four cases were transferred, two intra-district and two across districts in the same
state. See supra note 75.
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widespread litigation. I also removed twelve cases of debtors that duplicate
services provided in the private market - two hospitals, four senior living
communities, three YMCAs, and three others. For example, the senior living
community cases involve real estate development, and the faith-based por-
tions of the debtors' missions are only tangentially related to their everyday
operations; similarly, the YMCAs are part of a national coordinated network
of organizations that provide recreational services with minimal to no empha-
sis on faith.8' Removal of these institutions and their cases produced a final
dataset of 497 cases filed by 454 unique religious organizations.8 2
As depicted in Figure 1, the number of cases filed by religious entities
per year exhibited an upward trend from 2006 to 2011.83 In contrast, total
80. See Lipson, supra note 2, at 363-65 (analogizing the diocese cases to mass
tort bankruptcy cases and commenting that "[a]s with most mass tort bankruptcies,
these cases present a struggle between two sets of comparatively innocent parties: tort
claimants (the victims of the sexual abuse) and other creditors, on the one hand, ver-
sus the parishioners, or church members, on the other").
81. See The Y: About Us, YMCA, http://www.ymca.net/about-us/ (last visited
Aug. 29, 2013). The hospitals' cases also implicate rarely used provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code and other unique considerations. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 333 (2012)
(requiring the appointment of a patient care ombudsman within thirty days of the
petition date unless the court finds that the appointment is unnecessary based on the
facts of the case); id. § 363(d)(1) (providing that bankruptcy cannot be used to evade
state and federal processes regarding hospital sales). The three other debtors operate
businesses that predominately provide services available in the private market: the
first (Church Mortgage and Loan Corporation) issued mortgages to faith-based insti-
tutions, the second (Lambuth University) is a now-closed university, and the third
(Fox River Country Day School) is a now-closed school with religious roots, but
unclear continued affiliation. See Motion of the Debtor-in-Possession for an Order
Approving the Sale of Real Property (Hemlock Hills), In re Church Mortg. & Loan
Corp., No. 608BKO2363 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. Mar. 28, 2008) [hereinafter Church Mort-
gage]; Court Docket, In re Lambuth University, No. 11-11942 (Bankr. N.D. Tenn.
June 30, 2011); Richard Morgan, Board of Lambuth University in Jackson Votes to
Cease Operations June 30, THE COMMERCIAL APPEAL (last updated Apr. 14, 2011,
10:59 PM), http://www.commercialappeal.com/news/20 11/apr/14/lambuth-university-
jackson-close-its-doors-june-30/; Court Docket, In re Fox River Country Day School,
No. 11-44558 (Bankr. N.D. 111. Nov. 1, 2011); Jameel Naqvi, Fox River Country Day
School Closing, DAILY HERALD (June 14, 2011, 5:21 PM), http://www.dailyherald.
com/article/20110614/news/706149859/.
82. Because the dataset contains data from several years, the possibility that the
findings are attributable to idiosyncratic factors of any individual year is minimized.
The effects of the Great Recession, of course, are apparent in the data and affect the
findings in this Article, as explored infra in Part IV.A.
83. Figure 1 presents the following data regarding cases filed per year of
the study:
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Chapter 11 filings, as reported by the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts (AO), increased from 2006 to 2009, when they peaked, and
decreased in 2010 and 2011. 8
Figure 1: Number of Total Chapter 11 Cases and Religious
Organization Chapter 11 Cases Filed
by Year of Study
L 160 16,000
o 120 12,000
80 8,0007
S40 4,000 -
00
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Religious Organization Cases -Total Chapter 11 Cases
The number of religious organization cases per year is exceedingly
small relative to estimates of the number of faith-based institutions operating
in the United States and relative to the number that close in a given year.
Because many have few members and lack permanent locations, determining
the precise number of organizations is difficult.8 5 However, as a rough (and
necessarily low) approximation of the number of religious entities operating
nationwide during a given year, research suggests that there were about
320,750 congregations operating in the United States in 2012 and about
323,643 congregations in 2013. Approximately 1% (3,208) of religious
Year
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Religious Organiation Cases 42 71 87 1 85 96 116
Total Chapter II Cases 5,090 6,255 10,029 15,025 13,552 11,309
84. See Bankruptcy Statistics, supra note 77. Total Chapter II filings figures
exclude cases filed outside the fifty United States and the District of Columbia.
85. Determining the precise number of organizations also is difficult because in
addition to often automatically being considered tax-exempt under the Internal Reve-
nue Code, churches, mission societies, and certain other faith-based institutions are
not required to file tax returns with the IRS. See Tax Guide for Churches and Reli-
gious Organizations, supra note 76, at 3, 22.
86. Quick Facts About Nonprofits, NATIONAL CENTER FOR CHARITABLE
STATISTICS, http://nccs.urban.org/statistics/quickfacts.cfm (last visited Aug. 29, 2013)
(providing a frequently updated approximation of congregations in the United States).
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congregations close their doors each year.87 Of those 3,208, about 2.6% (83)
file under Chapter 11.88
Of the ninety possible federal jurisdictions, the cases in the dataset came
from sixty-nine jurisdictions. Interestingly, half of the cases originated in
just ten jurisdictions. During the study's timeframe, Chapter 11 cases more
generally also were filed in a small, though different, set of jurisdictions.90
Table I summarizes the distribution of religious organization cases across
these ten jurisdictions as contrasted with the percentage of all Chapter 11
cases that originated in those jurisdictions during the study's timeframe. 9 1
Overall, religious institutions are filing at different rates and in different loca-
tions than other Chapter 11 debtors. 9 2
This figure is similar to other estimates of religious congregations during the
study's timeframe. See, e.g., U.S. Religious Census 2010: Summary Findings,
RELIGIOUS CONGREGATIONS & MEMBERSHIP STUDY, Association of Statisticians of
American Religious Bodies, 6 (May 1, 2010), available at http://www.rcms2010.org/
press release/ACP%2020120501.pdf (reporting approximately 344,900 religious
congregations in 2010) [hereinafter U.S. Religious Census 2010J; Number of
Nonprofit Organizations in the United States, 1999-2009, NATIONAL CENTER FOR
CHARITABLE STATISTICS, http://nccsdataweb.urban.org/PubApps/profilel.php?state=
US (last visited Aug. 29, 2013) (reporting approximately 385,900 religious
congregations in 2009); Amy Blackwood et al., The Nonprofit Sector in Brief
Facts and Figures From the Nonprofit Almanac 2008, NATIONAL CENTER FOR
CHARITABLE STATISTICS 1 (2008) (reporting approximately 350,000 religious congre-
gations in 2008).
87. See Shawna L. Anderson et. al, Dearly Departed: How Often Do Congrega-
tions Close?, 47 J. SCI. STUD. RELIGION 321, 325-26 (2008).
88. The precise calculation of these percentages is as follows. Of the 497 reli-
gious organizations that filed over the six years of this study, on average 83 filed each
year. Thus, 0.0256% of the 320,750 congregations operating each year file under
Chapter 11 in any given year. If 1% of the 320,750 congregations close during any
given year, on average 3,208 close per year. Thus, 2.59% of the religious organiza-
tions that close during a given year file under Chapter 11.
89. The study excludes cases filed outside the fifty United States and the District
of Columbia, See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
90. 48% of all Chapter 11 cases filed during the study's timeframe came from
ten jurisdictions. Four of these jurisdictions are among the jurisdictions from which
the majority of religious organizations' cases originated. The overlapping jurisdic-
tions are the Central District of California, Middle District of Florida, Northern Dis-
trict of Georgia, and Northern District of Texas.
91. Where applicable, I report "Ns," the number of cases or debtors in the analy-
sis. In Table 1, N for Religious Organization Debtors is 497, and N for All Chapter 11
Debtors is 61,260. Transferred cases were counted as originating from the jurisdiction
to which they were transferred.
92. This may indicate that local legal culture or social networks are influencing
bankruptcy filings of faith-based organizations. See, e.g. Jean Braucher, Lawyers and
Consumer Bankruptcy: One Code, Many Cultures, 67 AM. BANKR. L. J. 501 (1993)
(noting that consumer bankruptcy law is local in character, with each bankruptcy
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Table 1: Ten Jurisdictions with Greatest Percentage of Religious
Organization Filings During Study Timeframe
Religious
Organization All Chapter 11
Cases Filed Cases Filed
Jurisdiction N % N %
N.D. Georgia 53 10.7 1,791 2.9
M.D. Florida 38 7.7 2,879 4.7
W.D. Tennessee 27 5.4 323 0.5
C.D. California 24 4.8 4,791 7.8
N.D. Texas 22 4.4 1,868 3.1
S.D. Texas 21 4.2 1,684 2.8
D. Maryland 18 3.6 1,210 2.0
N.D. Illinois 18 3.6 1,504 2.5
E.D. North Carolina 17 3.4 1,689 2.8
S.D. Florida 16 3.2 697 1.1
Total 254 51.1 18,436 30.1
For each case, I coded financial information such as assets, debts, and
the number of secured, priority, and unsecured creditors. 93 I also tracked the
instances of filing and disposition of certain motions - such as to lift the au-
tomatic stay, to sell certain or all of the debtor's property, and to dismiss or
convert - which provide a chronological history of each case. Additionally,
relying on disclosure statements regarding Chapter 11 plans, proposed plans,
other case filings, Internet searches, and news stories, I identified the nature,
court and bar having its own practices and legal culture); Teresa Sullivan et al., The
Persistence of Local Legal Culture: Twenty Years of Evidence from the Federal
Bankruptcy Courts, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 801 (1994) (describing how practic-
es in bankruptcy courts vary greatly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction); Jay Lawrence
Westbrook, Local Legal Culture and the Fear of Abuse, 6 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV.
25 (1998) (noting the existence of local legal culture in the bankruptcy system and
arguing that fear of abuse of the system is instrumental in creating this culture);
Michelle M. Miller, Working Paper, Social Networks and Personal Bankruptcy (June
20, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2088192
(last visited Aug. 29, 2013) (examining the role of social networks in a household's
decision to file for bankruptcy); Barry Scholnick, Working Paper, Bankruptcy Spillo-
vers Between Close Neighbors (April 2013), available at http://www.business.ualber-
ta.ca/BarryScholnick/-/media/business/FacultyAndStaff/MBEL/BarryScholnick/Doc
uments/JournalArticles/BK Neighbor 14Apr2013.pdf (examining whether individu-
als in Canada are influenced to file for bankruptcy based on the prior bankruptcies of
their close neighbors) (last visited Aug. 29, 2013).
93. See infra note 103 regarding schedules with incomplete information.
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operations, and formation year of each organization, the circumstances lead-
ing to the debtor's bankruptcy filing, the reasons for the case's disposition,
and whether the organization remained in operation post-bankruptcy. 94 Col-
lectively, these data not only provide an overview of the religious organiza-
tions and their bankruptcy cases, but also can be analyzed to observe the
workings of bankruptcy courts.95
B. Characteristics ofFaith-Based Organization Debtors
The faith-based organizations that filed under Chapter 11 during the
study's timeframe predominately operate places of worship, and occasionally
an accompanying daycare, school, food pantry, or halfway house. Their affil-
iations span religious beliefs and reflect the general religious makeup of the
96 9American population. For example, as detailed in Table 2, more than nine
out of ten of the debtors are associated with Christian denominations, a statis-
tic comparable with the religious affiliation of the American population and
the percentage of religious congregations that are Christian in the United
States."
94. In some instances, this information was difficult to identify. For example, in
some cases I relied on the debtor's name to determine denomination or affiliation and
operations. I was unable to identify the reason for filing for a quarter of the cases.
Likewise, I was unable to identify the debtor's formation year in a fifth of the cases.
In addition, because religious organizations are difficult to track even at a time when
many maintain an online presence, I only was able to identify reliably the continued
operation or closure of about a third of the debtors. Finally, as of November 2012, 63
of the cases remained open. Of those, the court had entered orders in 7 cases that
effectively disposed of the case, leaving 56 cases pending. See infra note 137. The
results of this study should be interpreted with these limitations in mind.
95. Because the cases in the dataset come from 69 of 90 possible jurisdictions
and half originate in ten jurisdictions, the results presented in the Article do not reflect
a nationwide representative sample of Chapter II cases and should be considered
with this limitation in mind.
96. See U.S. Religious Landscape Survey, The Pew Forum on Religious & Pub-
lic Life, available at http://religions.pewforum.org/affiliations (last visited Aug. 29,
2013) [hereinafter U.S. Religious Landscape Survey].
97. N = 454. The table includes unique debtors. If an organization filed more
than once during the study's timeframe, it is only counted once. Other religions in-
clude Buddhist, Hindu, and Islamic affiliated debtors. The "other" place of worship is
a non-denominational, non-Christian "center for peace."
98. Removing non-affiliated Americans (such as atheist and agnostic), 94% of
the religious American population is Christian of some denomination. See U.S. Reli-
gious Landscape Survey, supra note 96. Approximately 97% of religious congrega-
tions in the United States are Christian. See U.S. Religious Census 2010, supra note
86. Comparing people affiliated with a religion and congregations is less than ideal.
However, because there is little information about the religious makeup of the United
States, I include both comparisons.
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Table 2: Main Operation Type of Unique Religious Organization
Chapter 11 Debtors
Other
Operation Type Christian Jewish Religions Other
Place of Worship 412 9 6 1
School 11 8 0 0
Community Assistance / Other 1 0 0 6
Total Frequency 424 17 6 7
(Percent) (93.4%) (3.7%) (1.3%) (1.5%)
However, the composition of Christian-affiliated debtors does not mirror
the breakdown of Christian congregations by denomination in America. 99
Many of the Christian-affiliated debtors are non-denominational and almost
all of those with clear affiliations are Protestant. 00 These congregations like-
ly are not subject to broad governing bodies that may monitor their finances
and provide assistance if necessary, potentially motivating their bankruptcy
filings. Rather, they often are congregationalist, which in effect leaves them
on their own with fewer options when they encounter financial problems.o
The religious organization debtors in the study are diverse in size based
on total assets and debts, and in how long they operate before seeking bank-
99. See U.S. Religious Census 2010, supra note 86.
100. Of the 412 debtors operating Christian places of worship, I identified 191
with clear denominations. Of these, 93% are Protestant and 6% are of other denomi-
nations. In contrast, 86% of Christian congregations in the United States are
Protestant. See U.S. Religious Census 2010, supra note 86.
101. Congregationalist churches are governed by a structure through which each
congregation independently and autonomously runs its own affairs. For instance,
Pentecostal churches, which account for 22% of the debtors with clear denominations,
are congregationalist. See About Us, United Pentecostal Church International,
http://www.upci.org/about-us/about-us (last visited Nov. 29, 2012); see also Kent
Greenawalt, Hands Off! Civil Court Involvement in Conflicts over Religious Property,
98 COLUM. L. REV. 1843, 1849 (1998) (distinguishing between a religious congrega-
tion that "is strictly independent of other ecclesiastical associations" and "owes no ...
obligation to any higher authority," and a congregation holding property that "is but a
subordinate member of some general church organization in which there are superior
ecclesiastical tribunals with a general and ultimate power of control more or less
complete, in some supreme judicatory over the whole membership of that general
organization"); Scott Thumma, Exploring the Megachurch Phenomenon: Their Char-
acteristics and Cultural Context, HARTFORD INSTITUTE FOR RELIGIOUS RESEARCH
(1996), http://hirr.hartsem.edu/bookshelf/thumma-article2.html (last visited Aug. 29,
2013) (discussing the affiliation structure of megachurches and noting that most
churches with denominational ties are associated with "denominations with a congre-
gational polity which gives considerable freedom to individual churches").
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ruptcy protection. Table 3 summarizes the key financial and survival charac-
teristics of the debtors in this study.102 Of note, in sixty-nine of the 497 cases
in the study the debtor did not file complete schedules, and in thirty-eight
cases the debtor's case was dismissed for not retaining counsel, both of which
are easily met prerequisites for a corporation's Chapter 11 case.io3
Table 3: Financial and Other Characteristics ofReligious
Organization Chapter 11 Debtors
Mean Median
Total Assets, $ 2,819,518 1,309,068
Real Property, $ 2,581,571 1,213,245
Personal Property, $ 253,300 49,414
Total Debts, $ 2,038,008 964,620
Debts Secured by Real Property, $ 1,694,544 810,890
Total Secured Debts, $ 1,760,086 866,667
Priority Debts, $ 31,995 0
Unsecured Debts, $ 260,177 30,019
Total Debts to Total Assets 1.4 0.8
Real Property Secured Debts to Real Property 0.9 0.7
N Secured Creditors 2.8 2.0
N Priority Creditors 1.3 0.0
N Unsecured Creditors 8.7 4.0
Years of Operation 23.0 15.0
102. N for financial figures except real property secured debts to real property is
428. N for real property secured debts to real property is 414. N for years of opera-
tion is 365. N of priority creditors excludes one case with over 200 priority creditors.
Similarly, N of unsecured creditors excludes three cases with over 200 unsecured
creditors. Secured debts include all secured debts (i.e., mortgage debt, automobile
debt, and equipment debt).
103. The schedules in 69 cases were missing or reported incomplete information
regarding assets, and the schedules in 60 cases were missing or reported incomplete
information regarding debts. Courts have held that corporations are artificial entities
that must be represented by counsel. See, e.g., Palazzo v. Gulf Oil Corp., 764 F.2d
1381, 1385 (1Ith Cir. 1985); see also 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(1) (2012) (providing that the
debtor must filed schedules and certain other documents). That 14% of the religious
organizations did not file complete schedules and that 8% did not retain counsel may
suggest further that local legal culture or social networks are influencing these filings.
See supra note 92.
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The largest case in the dataset, the case of megachurch Crystal Cathedral
Ministries, involved $73 million in assets and $58 million in debts,'0 while
the smallest involved only $6,090 in assets and $157,262 in debts. 0 5 As evi-
dent by Table 3, the total assets and debts of the debtors are skewed, with
several debtors with large amounts of assets and debts, thereby making mean
assets and debts much larger than median assets and debts. In general, almost
two-thirds of the religious organizations arrive in bankruptcy court holding
between $500,000 and $5 million in assets and owing between $500,000 and
$5 million in debts. Moreover, 76% of the organizations qualify as small
business debtors based on scheduled debts.' 06
A comparison of debts to assets reveals that 72% of the debtors are bal-
ance sheet solvent when they file.' 07 As with total assets and debts, the debt-
ors' debt-to-asset ratios are highly skewed, with almost 50% of debtors owing
between half and the full value of their assets, and less than 10% owing more
than twice the value of their assets.
104. Summary of Schedules, In re Crystal Cathedral Ministries, No. 8:10-bk-
24771 RK (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2010). Unless otherwise indicated, all monetary
numbers in this Article are reported in constant December 2011 dollars using the
Consumer Price Index (CPI-U) tables as published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics
on a monthly basis. See Consumer Price Index, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
http://www.bls.gov/cpi/#tables (last visited Nov. 29, 2012). All monetary numbers
are inflated to December 2011 dollars based on the month and year of filing.
105. Voluntary Petition at 18, In re God's Fountain of Love Learning Center, Inc.,
Doc. 1, No. 08-67677 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. April 28, 2008). These figures are adjusted to
December 2011 dollars. See supra note 104.
106. The Code provides that a small business debtor is a debtor with aggregate
debts as of the petition date not exceeding $2,343,300 (as adjusted effective April
2010). See supra note 43. Based on other factors, some of these cases may not have
qualified as small business cases. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(51C), (51D) (2012). Indeed,
"small business debtor" is defined as "a person engaged in commercial or business
activities (including any affiliate of such person that is also a debtor under this title
and excluding a person whose primary activity is the business of owning or operating
real property or activities incidental thereto) . . . ." Id. § 101(51D)(A). This
definition suggests that the organizations in this study should not be categorized as
small business debtors because they are not engaged in business activities.
Nonetheless, many of these debtors' cases proceeded as small business cases, and a
few were dismissed based on the debtors' failure to comply with the Code's small
business provisions.
107. N = 428. The figure is based on the total assets and debts scheduled in each
case. Thus, the scheduled assets and debts of an organization that filed under Chapter
II more than once during the study's timeframe are included as many times as that
organization filed and reported assets and debts. A debt-to-asset ratio of 1.0 or lower
indicates solvency. The Code similarly defines an entity as insolvent when the sum of
its debts is greater than the sum of its assets. 11 U.S.C. § 101(32). Because debtors
have an incentive to report inflated asset values on their schedules to overstate their
financial condition, this percentage should be considered a high estimate of the por-
tion of solvent debtors in the dataset. See, e.g., Lawless et al., supra note 63, at 859.
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In addition, the survival of congregations that have existed for decades
is on the line when the religious organizations file for bankruptcy protection.
The lengths of time the institutions operate before filing also vary, spanning
from two years to over 130 years. os However, half of the organizations sur-
vive between ten and forty years before they file.
Compared to the asset, debt, and solvency characteristics of other Chap-
ter 11 business debtors, the religious organization debtors tend to own much
more and owe less, which has implications for how their cases inform theo-
ries of business reorganization. For example, nearly 50% of the "small busi-
ness" Chapter 11 debtors in the Baird-Morrison study arrived in bankruptcy
court with less than $500,000 in assets, and 81% had less than $1 million.109
Approximately 70% of the debtors in the same study owed debts less than $1
million."o These results were similar to the asset and debt levels reported in
two other studies of Chapter 11 debtors published in the 1990s.I' In con-
trast, half of the religious organization debtors in this study scheduled less
than the equivalent of $1 million in assets.112 Taking inflation into account,
the median religious organization in the study holds over six times more as-
sets when it files than the median small business in the Baird-Morrison
study." 3 In addition, 62% owe less than the equivalent of $1 million in debts.
The discrepancy between asset and debt levels is evident in the percent-
age of solvent debtors in this study versus previous studies. In a study of
small business filings in 1994, only 42% of the Chapter 11 debtors in the
sample were balance sheet solvent at the time of filing.114 Similarly, in the
Baird-Morrison study, the debtors arrived in bankruptcy court with a median
debt-to-asset ratio of 3.3, indicating that the median debtor owed more than
108. See supra note 94 regarding the percentage of debtors with identifiable
formation years. The length of operation figures reported in the Article do not
account for previous bankruptcy filings. If a religious organization filed more than
once during the study's timeframe or had filed for bankruptcy prior to the study's
timeframe, its reported length of operation is included in the calculation despite its
multiple bankruptcy filings.
109. Bankruptcy Decision Making, supra note 19, at 386. These figures are in
1998 dollars. The Baird-Morrison study removed public companies and businesses
using Chapter 11 to sell assets or settle disputes from the dataset. Id at 385. Based
on reported debt levels, it included debtors with scheduled debts greater than $3
million (in 1998 dollars). Id at 386. Overall, the size of the debtors in this study is
sufficiently similar to the size of the debtors in the Baird-Morrison study for general
companson.
110. Id at 388 tbl.3 ("68.4 percent of businesses in the [study] had less than $1
million in debt.").
111. Id ("[T]he percentages from the [other two studies] are 65.7 percent and 73.4
percent, respectively.").
112. See CPI Inflation Calculator, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTIcs, http://www.bls.
gov/data/inflation calculator.htm (last visited Nov. 29, 2012).
113. See id; Baird & Morrison, supra note 22, at 2324 tbl.2.
114. Financial Characteristics, supra note 63, at 539.
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three times the value of its assets." 5 By comparison, the religious organiza-
tion debtors owe a median of three-fourths of the value of their assets, and
72% are balance sheet solvent when they file.116
Contrasting the percentage of assets and debts related to real property
across debtors makes the difference even more apparent. In the Baird-
Morrison study, the small business Chapter 11 debtors held a mean of ap-
proximately 30% of their assets in land and real property."l 7 The faith-based
institutions in this study hold three times more of their property as real es-
tate." They also enter bankruptcy with secured debt accounting for a medi-
an of 96% of total debt." 9 Conversely, secured debt of the median small
business debtor in the Baird-Morrison study accounted for only 44% of its
total debt.120 Overall, as compared to business Chapter 11 debtors, religious
organizations own more property and owe a greater percentage of what they
own to secured creditors with negotiating power.121
The organizations seemingly own more because they have time to ac-
cumulate real property based on how long they operate prior to filing. The
debtors in this study operated for a significantly longer time before seeking
bankruptcy protection than the businesses in other studies. For instance, the
small business debtors in the Baird-Morrison study were an average of seven
years old at the time of filing,122 whereas the faith-based entities in this study
on average survived twenty-three years before filing.123 During this time, the
religious organizations purchased real property accounting for a median of
90% of their total assets, and incurred debts secured by that real property
accounting for a median of 93% of their total debts.124
Considered together, these figures indicate that religious organizations,
though still relatively small in terms of total assets, exist long enough to ac-
cumulate valuable real property, though are unable to pay off most of the debt
owing on the property. They thus enter Chapter 11 owing significant portions
of the value of that real property, but nonetheless are solvent and hold com-
fortable equity cushions in their real property.125 As explored in the follow-
115. Baird & Morrison, supra note 22, at 2324 tbl.2. The mean ratio was a con-
siderably higher 15.2. Id.
116. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
117. Baird & Morrison, supra note 22, at 2333-34 tbl.6.
118. See supra Table 3.
119. N = 428.
120. See Baird & Morrison, supra note 22, at 2346 tbl.14.
121. See supra Table 3.
122. Bankruptcy Decision Making, supra note 19, at 387 tbl.2.
123. See supra Table 3.
124. N for both figures = 428.
.125. The term "equity cushion" as used in this Article means the ownership in
property above the amount needed to meet debts securing that property. The median
religious organization debtor owes 70% of the value of the real property. See supra
Table 3. Indeed, 78% of the debtors own real property worth more than the secured
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ing two Parts, the desire to preserve their congregations in the buildings they
worked hard to be able to afford often drives their filings. The circumstances
underlying the financial problems that led them to bankruptcy, and the history
and outcomes of their cases, offer an avenue to a previously unexplored ac-
count of the use and effectiveness of Chapter 11. The following two Parts
first trace the history and outcomes of the religious entities' cases, and then
tell the stories of the debtors in this study.
III. EFFICIENCIES AND OUTCOMES
An examination of the procedural history and outcomes of the religious
organizations' cases reveals how quickly bankruptcy courts processed their
cases as a whole, and what portion of their cases preserved value for the insti-
tutions and other interested parties. This investigation more generally pro-
vides some evidence of bankruptcy courts' efficiency and efficacy. In as-
sessing Chapter 11 reorganization, scholars and other commentators have
leveled two main criticisms: bankruptcy courts allow cases to drag on indefi-
nitely to the detriment of creditors, and successes in Chapter 11 are infrequent
because only a small percentage of cases result in confirmed plans. 126 The
cases in this study suggest a different picture of bankruptcy courts and reor-
ganization. The results detailed in this Part supplement more recent studies
arguing that the Chapter 11 system is not as broken as historically believed,
and certainly not so broken that it needs to be scrapped entirely,127 as some
have concluded. 128
debt they owe on it (N = 414). Overall, because debtors have an incentive to report
inflated asset values on their schedules, the financial figures discussed above should
be considered high estimates of the value of religious organizations' assets relative to
the debts owed on those assets. See, e.g., Lawless et al., supra note 63, at 859 ("The
bankruptcy petition is a tool for the debtor's advocate who may paint an overoptimis-
tic picture of the debtor's financial condition and inflate asset values.").
126. See Success of Chapter 11, supra note 19, at 604-05 ("[Critics] claim that the
current Chapter 11 system suffers from high failure rates and endless delays that pre-
vent the system from yielding much value."); Bankruptcy Decision Making, supra
note 19, at 381-82 (noting that critics argue that "Chapter 11 prevents or retards the
reallocation of the assets . . . . Rent-seeking competition among secured and unse-
cured creditors dominates a process overseen by judges who lack business training
and are biased in favor of preserving businesses that should be liquidated").
127. See Success of Chapter 11, supra note 19, at 605-06 ("These data show that
much of the conventional wisdom about key elements of Chapter 11 is simply wrong.
Contrary to so many assertions, Chapter 11 has been far more successful than sup-
posed."); Bankruptcy Decision Making, supra note 19, at 382-83 ("1 present evidence
that challenges the traditional view as it applies to small-business Chapter II cases.").
128. See, e.g., Barry E. Adler, Bankruptcy and Risk Allocation, 77 CORNELL
L. REv. 439, 463-64 (1992) (arguing that the benefits of bankruptcy cannot outweigh
its costs).
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The first subpart investigates certain indications of the efficiency of
bankruptcy courts by examining how well they separate viable from nonvia-
ble cases, how long it takes them to do so, and how much longer viable enti-
ties remain in Chapter 11 before plan confirmation. The second subpart fo-
cuses on the cases' outcomes to investigate whether they may be considered
successful. This subpart also reveals key aspects of the debtors' pre-
bankruptcy operations that led them to seek to reorganize under Chapter 11,
and begins to outline the stories developed in Part IV.
A. Responsive Bankruptcy Courts
Chapter 11 undoubtedly imposes costs. Filing invokes the automatic
stay, which prevents creditors from collecting on their debts, and which may
give a debtor the chance to delay its demise or reorganization.129 This
strategic delay is a long-prevailing description of what happens in a typical
Chapter 11 case.' 30 Conversely, creditors may overrun the process, pushing
bankruptcy courts to eject viable organizations from Chapter 11 before those
entities have a chance to reorganize, thereby forcing liquidation and destroy-
ing value.' 3' Additionally, administrative expenses accrue during the Chapter
11 process, decreasing the value available to creditors.132 The time spent in
bankruptcy is also generally thought to lead to a loss of value.' 33
But the process can be beneficial if viable organizations are identified
and promptly reorganized. Reorganization generally is thought to preserve
going-concern value.134 In the context of religious organizations, the asset
and debt composition detailed above suggests that they file to save the real
property in which they hold a substantial equity cushion. Preserving this
equity cushion beyond what is achievable outside bankruptcy may be the
129. See Success of Chapter I], supra note 19, at 623.
130. See id. at 623-24 ("Scheming debtors and their dilatory counsel sapped
all the value out of a business and left it a hollow shell - or so goes the conven-
tional wisdom.").
131. See Bankruptcy Decision Making, supra note 19, at 392-93 ("The opposite
bias could, of course, arise if creditors control the bankruptcy process. Seeking
immediate payment, creditors could push the process toward liquidation of
viable businesses.").
132. Id. at 382.
133. See Success of Chapter I, supra note 19, at 625 ("[T]he time spent in bank-
ruptcy itself leads to the loss of value, comprising an indirect cost."); Bankruptcy
Decision Making, supra note 19, at 390 (noting that the longer the Chapter II pro-
cess, "the greater the cost to debtors and creditors"). But see Ralph Brubaker & Ken-
neth L. Klee, Debate, Resolved: The 1978 Bankruptcy Code Has Been A Success, 12
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 273, 276 nn.12-13 (noting studies that challenge the pre-
dominate view that the time spent in Chapter 11 leads to a loss of value).
134. See Success of Chapter 11, supra note 19, at 625 ("[I]t is generally thought
that successful reorganization preserves value, especially going-concern value, com-
pared with a liquidation option.").
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main benefit of their cases. Even a liquidation plan might preserve value by
setting a mechanism for the orderly sale of a business's property, thereby
garnering more money to be distributed than what could be achieved by the
typical Chapter 7 process or a sale outside bankruptcy.135 Of course, reorgan-
ization may allow a congregation to continue gathering and sending their kids
to daycare and school in the same physical space in which they have assem-
bled for years, which may be the congregation's ultimate goal. 136
The question then is whether bankruptcy courts are striking a positive
balance between benefits and costs when handling debtors, creditors, and
other interested parties with diverging interests - that is, dismissing cases
destined for failure quickly, while providing viable entities an opportunity to
reorganize (or complete a going-concern sale) and monitoring their progress
to ensure that they do so expeditiously given their individual circumstances.
A variety of mechanisms exist to measure bankruptcy courts' efficiency and
effectiveness - most notably, procedural history.137 I explore the procedural
history of the cases in the study below, which points toward the conclusion
that bankruptcy courts seem to move both more swiftly and carefully than
traditionally believed, quickly dismissing the cases of nonviable religious
institutions and granting those with reorganization prospects time to work
with creditors and to propose confirmable plans.
135. But see Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph M. Doherty, Bankruptcy Fire Sales, 106
MICH. L. REV. 1 (2007) (finding that the recoveries in reorganization cases of large
public companies are more than double the recoveries from going concern sales, and
attributing the low recoveries in sale cases to continuing market illiquidity).
136. See infra Part IV; see also Success of Chapter 11, supra note 19, at 625 ("A
reorganization is also thought to produce substantial positive externalities, such as
maintaining employment, preserving the local tax base, and advancing community
stability."); Warren, supra note 22, at 787-88 (describing bankruptcy as "an attempt
to reckon with a debtor's multiple defaults and to distribute the consequences among
a number of different actors," including employees, suppliers, and the surrounding
community).
137. 1 use the term "procedural history" in this Article to mean the incidences and
timing of filing of motions and other documents in a case and the bankruptcy court's
disposition of those documents. See Success of Chapter 11, supra note 19, at 626-34
(assessing bankruptcy courts' ability to sort cases based on time to dismissal or con-
firmation); Bankruptcy Decision Making, supra note 19, at 393 (assessing continua-
tion bias by examining procedural history). Post-bankruptcy history and bankruptcy
courts' ability to sort economically distressed debtors from financially distressed
debtors also has been used to assess bankruptcy courts' efficiency. However, because
of the difficulties in tracking the religious organizations post-bankruptcy and in cate-
gorizing debtors as economically or financially distressed pre-bankruptcy, I rely on
procedural history. See supra note 94.
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1. Identifying the Doomed to Fail
The Chapter 11 cases in this study ended in one of three main ways -
dismissal, confirmation of a plan of reorganization, or confirmation of a plan
of liquidation or liquidation by sale. 138 Bankruptcy courts disposed of the
cases in the study in a median of 228 days (seven and a half months). Con-
sistent with recent studies that found median case durations of 5.7 months and
nine months,140 this figure alone challenges the notion that the Chapter 11
process is relatively lengthy as compared to reasonable benchmarks, such as
the four to nine months business brokerage firms report it takes to sell a busi-
138. Technically, the finish of a case occurs when the case is closed. However,
the true end of a case is when the dispositive motion is granted, such as a motion to
dismiss or for confirmation of a plan. The case often remains open for administrative
reasons. See Success of Chapter II, supra note 19, at 627 n.86 ("When a case is
closed may often depend more on the schedule and resources of a clerk's office than
upon anything about the substantive resolution of the case."); Stephen Lubben, Busi-
ness Liquidation, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 65, 81 (2007) (measuring time to resolution in
Chapter 11 as the time from case filing to plan confirmation, and not using case clo-
sure as the endpoint because cases often remain open for tactical reasons and because
the terms of confirmed plans may provide that many Code provisions no longer apply
to the debtor); Stephen P. Ferris & Robert M. Lawless, The Expenses of Financial
Distress: The Direct Costs of Chapter 11, 61 U. PITr. L. REV. 629, 637 (2000) ("Con-
sistent with other studies, we measured time in reorganization as the time from filing
through confirmation of the chapter 11 plan."). Chapter 11 proceedings typically also
end in a fourth main way - conversion. See Success of Chapter 11, supra note 19, at
627. However, section 1112(c) prohibits the conversion of a Chapter 11 case to a
Chapter 7 case if the debtor is a "non-moneyed, non-business or non-commercial
corporation" and the debtor does not consent to conversion. 11 U.S.C. § 1112(c)
(2012). This phrase includes corporations organized as nonprofits. Accordingly, few
motions to convert were filed and no cases in the study ended with conversion to
Chapter 7.
139. N = 471. 26 cases (5.2%) had not been disposed of by the end of November
2012. Calculated as of December 1, 2012, these cases were pending a median of 500
days. Because these cases have pended longer than those that have been disposed of,
once they conclude and are included in the calculation, the median time to resolution
will increase slightly. The 26 pending cases are excluded from the remainder of the
analysis in this subpart.
140. See Success of Chapter 11, supra note 19, at 629 (reporting a median time to
resolution of about 9 months); Bankruptcy Decision Making, supra note 19, at 391
tbl. 7 (reporting a median duration of 5.7 months). But see Ferris & Lawless, supra
note 138, at 637 (reporting a median time to resolution of 395 days).
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nessl41 and the median of approximately eight months that similar bankruptcy
cases pended under the Bankruptcy Act.142
Of note, in sixty-six cases the debtor did not schedule assets or debts and
did not file a plan. All of the cases were dismissed. Courts expelled these
debtors from Chapter II in a median of thirty-nine days (less than six
weeks).143 Likewise, courts dismissed cases based on the debtor's failure to
retain counsel in a median of thirty-five days.'" Bankruptcy courts seem to
move swiftly when faced with debtors that do not meet the Code's minimal
filing requirements.
Distinguishing between two types of cases bankruptcy courts en-
counter - those that warrant dismissal, and those that have a chance at con-
firming a plan (whether reorganization or liquidation) and thus merit keeping
in Chapter 11 - based on whether a plan was filed further shows that courts
dispose of the cases doomed to fail quickly and hold onto the meritorious
cases longer.14 5 Courts dismissed cases in which no plan was filed in a
median of four and a half months, and disposed of cases in which a plan was
filed in a median of eleven months.146 Indeed, courts dismissed over three-
quarters of cases with no plan in nine months or less. In contrast, they
dismissed or confirmed plans in less than one-third of the cases with proposed
plans during this timeframe. Of the cases that concluded after more than a
141. In the Baird-Morrison study, Professor Morrison cited this as a reasonable
benchmark against which to measure case duration. Bankruptcy Decision Making,
supra note 19, at 391.
142. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Trouble With Chapter 11, 1993 Wisc. L. REV.
729, 740 (deriving a time to disposition of a median of eight months based on the data
reported in a 1964 study of Chapter XI cases filed in six districts). Professor LoPucki
also summarizes studies that measure the length of Chapter 11 cases filed soon after
the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code and concludes that for "smaller companies,
that were taking a median time of only about eight months to reorganize, the change
from Chapter XI to Chapter 11 was a disaster. The time it took these companies to
reorganize more than doubled." Id. at 745. Other studies simply state that a median
time to resolution of around six to nine months is fast. See, e.g., Success of Chapter
II, supra note 19, at 631-32 ("[T]he median time for resolution of all cases that were
dismissed or converted was about seven months .... From the viewpoint of these exit
cases, the system's performance was remarkably quick.").
143. 85% of the cases were dismissed within three months, 94% within six
months, and all within a year.
144. N = 38.
145. See infra Part III.A.2 for a discussion of whether certain parties influenced
bankruptcy courts to dismiss potentially meritorious cases without giving debtors
sufficient time to prove their cases' merits. Professors Warren and Westbrook simi-
larly have distinguished between cases in which no plan was filed and cases in which
a plan was filed in discussing how the Chapter 11 system sorted cases. Success of
Chapter 11, supra note 19, at 630.
146. N for No Plan Filed is 272; N for Plan Filed is 199.
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year had passed, debtors filed a plan in 75% of cases.147 The data suggest
that bankruptcy courts appear to distinguish between those debtors that have a
chance of confirming a plan relatively early and continuously throughout the
Chapter 11 process.148
A similar analysis can be used to assess bankruptcy courts' overall effi-
ciency in evaluating seemingly viable cases.149 By filing a plan, the debtor
signals that its business may be salvageable. But the technical requirements
for filing a plan are not onerous.1 5 0 Courts thus must determine which plans
are likely to be confirmed and which are infeasible. Of the cases in which the
proposed plan was not confirmed, courts dismissed the case in a median of
six months after the plan was filed.' 5 1 Conversely, it took courts less time - a
median of four months after the plan was filed - to confirm a proposed
plan.152 Table 4 summarizes the time, measured from the petition date, that it
took courts to dispose of cases based on the cases' key characteristics.
Table 4: Months to Disposition of Religious Organization
Chapter 11 Debtors' Cases
Mean Median
All cases (N = 471) 8.9 7.5
Cases with incomplete schedules (N = 66) 2.0 1.3
Cases without counsel (N = 38) 1.7 1.1
Cases without a proposed plan (N = 272) 6.1 4.5
Cases with a proposed plan (N = 199) 12.9 11.0
Cases with an unconfirmed plan (N = 74) 14.3 13.4
Cases with a confirmed plan (N = 125) 12.0 10.4
As expected, the number of times a debtor amended its plan affected the
time in which the bankruptcy court confirmed the plan. On average, debtors
amended their plans once, but some amended three or four times. Courts
confirmed once-amended plans four months faster than they confirmed plans
147. 114 cases pended for more than a year before disposal. Plans were not filed
in 28 of those cases.
148. See Success of Chapter 11, supra note 19, at 634 (noting that patterns of
dismissal in 1994 and 2002 studies indicate that "courts are actively engaging in cull-
ing cases that have little prospect of confirming a plan of reorganization").
149. In Success of Chapter 11, Professors Warren and Westbrook similarly dis-
cussed "giving winners time to win." Id. at 632.
150. See id. at 618 ("Formally, a debtor needs little more than an explanation of
how the business will deal with its creditors and the prospects for continuing the busi-
ness. A thin plan may not win creditors over, but it signals the debtor's basic idea and
can be a basis for initiating negotiations with creditors.").
151. N = 74. Median days to dismissal were 182.
152. N = 125. Median days to confirmation were 122.
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amended three or four times, which suggests that courts afforded debtors time
to work with their creditors to propose feasible plans. 15 3 Interestingly, the
timing of when a debtor first proposed its plan during the course of the case
did not affect how quickly the plan was confirmed.
The data further suggest that bankruptcy courts continued to identify
cases with infeasible plans after initial plan proposal. Debtors amended their
plans less frequently in the cases in which courts did not confirm plans.' 5 4
Courts dismissed cases without amended plans faster than they disposed of
cases with amended plans. 55 Considering these results together, it may be
hypothesized that courts are better at identifying and dismissing cases without
plan confirmation prospects if the debtor does not file a plan. Once a plan is
filed, based on the cases in this study, courts generally confirm plans quickly
but allow cases to linger where they involve infeasible plans or other issues
that eventually will require their dismissal. Naturally, creditors may influ-
ence this process by representing to the court that they are working with the
debtor or simply by not objecting to a proposed plan. Courts also may use the
filing of, amendments to, and continued non-objection to a proposed plan as a
proxy for productive negotiations between a debtor and creditors or to identi-
fy a debtor that creditors and other parties believe can reorganize. Indeed, an
alternative explanation for some of the findings above is that parties and the
condition in which businesses arrive to Chapter 11 drive the results, and not
necessarily bankruptcy judges.156 Likewise, it is difficult to untwine whether
in dismissing nonviable debtors because they do not reach certain bench-
marks, such as proposing plans, courts simply do not allow debtors to reach
these benchmarks - that is, the results become self-fulfilling.157 Even so,
153. Courts confirmed once amended plans (N = 52) in a mean of 357 days, and
plans amended three or four times (N = 15) in a mean of 476 days.
154. N = 74. Debtors amended their plans an average of 0.56 times.
155. Courts dismissed cases without amended plans (N = 45) after an average of
423 days following the petition date, and those with amended plans (N = 29) after an
average of 458 days following the petition date. The timing of when a debtor first
proposed its plan did not impact the timing of case dismissal.
156. See, e.g., Jerome R. Kerkman, The Debtor in Full Control: A Case for Adop-
tion of the Trustee System, 70 MARQ. L. REv. 159, 182-83 (1987) (concluding, based
on a study of Chapter 11 filings in Milwaukee in 1982, that debtors controlled Chap-
ter 11 proceedings); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Debtor in Full Control -- Systems Failure
Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code? (pt. 1), 57 AM. BANKR. L. J. 99, 101
(1983) [hereinafter Systems Failure Part 1] (concluding that "generally the debtors
studied were successful in dictating the terms of reorganization to their creditors").
157. See, e.g., Success of Chapter 11, supra note 19, at 630 ("There is a high
potential for circular reasoning in describing what happened when cases were forced
out of the system quickly: once a case was forced out, it became, by definition, a
failure."). This Part should be assessed with this limitation in mind. Nonetheless, as
distinguishing between cases in which no plan was filed and cases in which a plan
was filed has been used to assess bankruptcy courts and the Chapter 11 process, the
results in this Part, at the very least, add to the results presented in previous work.
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overall, this result indicates a need for further research into how bankruptcy
courts assess cases once plans are proposed.
2. Influence of Debtors, Creditors, and Other Parties
Though bankruptcy courts in general appear to distinguish between
potentially nonviable and viable cases, one might be concerned that the
demands of particular parties have outsized influence on courts' decision
making. An analysis of the motions that led to each case's disposition sheds
light on which, if any, parties dominate the Chapter 11 process. Prevailing
accounts of Chapter 11 argue that debtors control the process while courts'
passivity prevents creditors from exercising desirable influence, leading to the
preservation of businesses whose cases actually require dismissal. 59
Alternatively, creditors or the United States Trustee (U.S. Trustee) could
drive the process.
The question is whether cases dismissed before plan confirmation actu-
ally warranted dismissal, or whether creditors or other parties forced a dis-
missal too early in the process. A review of the trajectory of the cases' dispo-
sitions does not show evidence of control - by debtors, creditors, or the U.S.
Trustee. Using which party moved to dismiss the case as a proxy for
158. Bankruptcy courts' difficulties in distinguishing feasible from infeasible
plans may be linked to the difficulties in distinguishing businesses that are economi-
cally distressed (and thus doomed), and those that merely are financially distressed
and capable of saving. See, e.g., Steven N. Kaplan, Federated's Acquisition and
Bankruptcy: Lessons and Implications, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1103, 1121-22 (1994) (not-
ing that economists have trouble "distinguish[ing] whether poor performance by a
firm in financial distress is caused by the financial distress alone or by the same fac-
tors that pushed the firm into financial distress in the first place").
159. See supra note 130 and accompanying text; see also Systems Failure Part 2,
supra note 66, at 272 (concluding that "the debtors studied were able to continue in
complete control of their businesses while they were under the jurisdiction of the
court. With the . . . exception of secured and priority creditors' ability to negotiate
their own treatment under a plan, creditors were effectively excluded from the process
of reorganization").
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control,160 as Table 5 details,' a party other than the debtor was responsible
for 75% of all dismissals.162
Table 5: Party Filing Successful Motion to Dismiss
No Plan Plan
Filed Filed Total Total %
Debtor 51 17 68 24.8
U.S. Trustee 59 30 89 32.5
Creditors 95 20 115 42.0
Appointed Trustee 1 1 2 0.7
Total 206 68 274 100.0
That creditors and the U.S. Trustee were the most active parties in these
cases may cause concern about their influence. However, bankruptcy courts
frequently denied creditors' motions to lift the automatic stay, and, likewise,
denied U.S. Trustees' motions to dismiss. For instance, in those cases in
which a plan was not filed, creditors moved at least once to lift the automatic
stay in approximately half of the cases.163 Courts granted 55% of these mo-
tions and denied less than 10%.'64 As to the remainder, the parties generally
reached a solution.
Additionally, in cases dismissed on creditors' motions, creditors filed at
least one motion to lift the stay in every case, but the bankruptcy court lifted
160. In the Baird-Morrison study, Professor Morrison relied on the proponent of
the motion to dismiss to measure which, if any, parties dominated the Chapter 11
process. Bankruptcy Decision Making, supra note 19, at 393-94.
161. Table 5 does not include cases dismissed by court order, such as for failure to
file documents, pay fees, retain counsel, or propose a confirmable plan. It also does
not include cases dismissed after plan confirmation. Those motions resulting in dis-
missal filed by the debtor or the U.S. Trustee after the court lifted the stay on real
property based on a creditor's motion are attributed to the creditor. Once the stay was
lifted, the debtor or U.S. Trustee had no choice but to move for dismissal, as there
was no property left to reorganize. See id.
162. This percentage is similar to the results of the Baird-Morrison study, in
which debtors were responsible for 17% of cases dismissals. Id. But see Kerkman,
supra note 156, at 182-83 (concluding that debtors predominately controlled Chapter
11 proceedings); Systems Failure Part 2, supra note 66, at 272 (also concluding that
debtors predominately controlled Chapter 11 proceedings).
163. This figure includes motions for relief from the stay filed by creditors se-
cured by personal property, such as automobiles or equipment. Creditors filed at least
one motion in 140 of the 286 cases without proposed plans.
164. These percentages are similar to the figures reported in the Baird-Morrison
study. Id. at 394 (reporting that creditors filed motions that would lead to shutdown
in 67.7% of cases ultimately ending with shutdown, but that judges granted them in
42% of the cases).
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the stay in the first instance in only a quarter of the cases. ss As an example,
in one case, in the span of seven months, the court denied two motions to
dismiss and one motion to lift the stay before eventually dismissing the case
on a creditor's motion.' Courts appeared to initially give debtors a chance
to show that they could reorganize successfully, but dismissed their cases
rather swiftly if the debtors did not make good use of that chance.
Bankruptcy courts' ostensible willingness to give debtors an opportunity
to reorganize seems further apparent in their denial of creditors' motions to
lift the stay in those cases in which a plan was confirmed. Creditors moved to
lift the stay in just over half of these cases. Courts granted at least one mo-
tion in 45% of the cases, and only about one-third of the total number of mo-
tions filed.167 All but two of these cases culminated in confirmation of a re-
organization plan.16 s Taking the cases in this study as a whole, courts appear
generally able to identify property that is not necessary to an effective reor-
ganization and provide creditors appropriate relief in these circumstances.
By allowing religious organization debtors to remedy procedural mis-
steps or giving them another chance to negotiate with creditors, courts may
have provided the debtors with the necessary time to formulate viable reor-
ganization strategies. Few debtors proposed plans at the beginning of their
cases; rather, most filed plans between four and nine months after the petition
date. Figure 2 depicts the time from the petition date to plan filing in cases
with proposed plans.169 Overall, debtors proposed plans within a median of
about six months after the petition date. As a whole, the history of the reli-
gious organizations' Chapter 11 cases suggests that no one party dominated
the process.170
165. Courts dismissed 32 cases based on a creditor's motion to dismiss, but only
granted the first filed motion to lift the stay in 8 of these cases. In 5 of these 8 cases,
the debtor did not file complete schedules.
166. Docket, In re New Life Holiness Church, No. 09-22360 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn.
Mar. 3, 2009).
167. Of the 125 cases in which a plan was confirmed, at least one motion to lift
the stay was filed in 67 cases. Courts granted at least one of these motions in 30 cases.
168. The court confirmed a liquidating plan in the two other cases.
169. N for Figure 2 is 211. Cases in which plans were filed but which remained
pending as of November 2012 are included.
170. This result is consistent with the Baird-Morrison study. Bankruptcy Decision
Making, supra note 19, at 394 ("These statistics strongly suggest that no party with a
predictable bias - debtors or creditors - completely dominates the bankruptcy pro-
cess; to the contrary, bankruptcy judges appear to play an important role in determin-
ing when a business should be shut down.").
2013] 51
MISSOURI LAWREVIEW
Figure 2: Cumulative Time to Filing ofPlan,
Religious Organization Debtors
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B. Varieties of Outcomes
The outcomes of the Chapter 11 cases in this study include dismissal be-
cause the bankruptcy court had lifted the automatic stay, dismissal on the
debtor's motion that it had reached an agreement with its creditors, and con-
firmation of a reorganization or liquidation plan. 171 A portion of these out-
comes preserved value for debtors and creditors; thus, those cases may be
categorized as ending productively. This subpart explores the outcomes of all
the cases in the dataset to pinpoint these successful cases.
Success can be (and has been) reported simply as the percentage of
cases in which a plan was confirmed.172 Of the cases in this study disposed of
either by dismissal or plan confirmation as of November 2012, 26.5%
171. See, e.g., Order Granting Motion to Dismiss Bankruptcy Case and Granting
Motion for Relief From Automatic Stay, In re Keys to Life, Inc., No. 10-08086
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. Apr. 7, 2010), Doc. 40; Order Approving Joint Motion for Authori-
ty to Compromise Controversy, Enter Into a Global Settlement Agreement and Dis-
miss This Chapter 11 Case, In re Cornerstone Faith Center, No. 11-01026 (Bankr.
N.D. Iowa May 2, 2011), Doc. 64; infra Table 6.
172. See, e.g., Success of Chapter II, supra note 19, at 615 (reporting confirma-
tion rate as a "naIve metric" of success); Systems Failure Part 1, supra note 156, at
106 ("'Success' in a chapter 11 proceeding can be an elusive concept. From the
viewpoint of the courts or policy makers, confirmation and consummation of a plan
are probably both necessary elements of success.").
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resulted in confirmed plans.173  This percentage is higher than the 17%
confirmation rate across all Chapter 11 cases reported by the AO in the 1980s
that has become the statistic most often quoted when discussing the perceived
failure of Chapter 11.174 It also is consistent with, though slightly lower than,
subsequently reported confirmation rates of around 30% in business
reorganization cases.175
Additionally, 82% of cases with confirmed reorganization plans ended
with the courts' issuances of final decrees, suggesting that a majority of debt-
ors consummate their reorganization plans.1 76 Excluding pending cases, 19%
of the debtors in this study confirmed and consummated reorganization
plans. 177 This rate is considerably higher than a previous report of plan con-
summation at 6.5%.
Previous studies also have reported success as the percentage of cases in
which plans were filed and confirmed versus all cases in which plans were
filed. 179 Among the religious organization cases, the court confirmed a plan
in 63% of the cases that included a proposed plan.Iso This percentage is simi-
lar to, though again slightly lower than, confirmation rates of cases with pro-
posed plans reported in other studies of business reorganization.i18
173. Of the 497 cases in the dataset, 26 in which a plan had not been filed or con-
firmed remained pending as of November 2012. These cases (5.2% of the cases) are
not included in the analysis because their disposition is unclear. See supra note 139.
174. ED FLYNN, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURT, STATISTICAL
ANALYSIS OF CHAPTER 11 (1989), at 10-11; see also Success of Chapter 11, supra
note 19, at 615.
175. See, e.g., Success of Chapter II, supra note 19, at 615 (reporting a 30.3%
confirmation rate in 1994 and a 33.4% confirmation rate in 2002); Anne Lawton,
Chapter II Triage: Diagnosing a Debtor's Prospects for Success, 54 ARIZ. L. REV.
985, 1004 (2012) (reporting a 34% confirmation rate in a sample of Chapter 11 cases
filed in 2004).
176. Of the 119 cases in which reorganizations plans were confirmed, 12 re-
mained pending as of November 2012. Of the remaining cases, 88 ended with the
issuance of a final decree or similar.
177. Total cases considered are 471, of which 88 ended with a consummated
reorganization plan.
178. Susan Jensen-Conklin, Do Confirmed Chapter 11 Plans Consummate? The
Results of a Study and Analysis of the Law, 97 COM. L. J. 297, 325 (1992) (reporting
on a study of Chapter 11 cases filed over a ten year period in Poughkeepsie, New
York, and finding that only 6.5% of debtors confirmed and consummated a reorgani-
zation plan).
179. See Success of Chapter 11, supra note 19, at 617-18.
180. N = 199. This figure does not include the 12 cases in which a plan was filed
but which had not been disposed of by November 2012.
181. See Success of Chapter 11, supra note 19, at 618 (reporting that plans were
confirmed in 65.5% and 71.6% of cases in which a plan was proposed among 1994
and 2002 filings, respectively); Lawton, supra note 175, at 1004 (reporting a confir-
mation rate, once plans were proposed, of 69%).
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However, merely measuring success based on plan confirmation does
not capture other beneficial outcomes of the Chapter 11 process. A number
of factors specific to the religious organizations and the reasons they sought
to reorganize may contribute to the slightly lower confirmation rate reported
in this study. What value the debtors and their creditors preserved through
the Chapter 11 process despite not confirming a plan thus may increase the
actual success rate to above 26.5%.182 Certainly some debtors did not file or
confirm plans because they did not have the funds or the organizational skills
to propose a feasible plan, or because after a few weeks (or months) of the
reorganization process they realized that their churches or schools were
doomed.'8 3 Courts identified and dismissed many of their cases soon after
the petition dates, thereby minimizing creditors' losses stemming from the
bankruptcy process.184
On the other hand, the most apparent successes absent plan confirmation
were the cases in which debtors reached an agreement with or otherwise
satisfied their creditors. In thirty-eight cases dismissed before plan confirma-
tion, debtors filed motions stating that the cases warranted dismissal because
they had reached an agreement with their main creditors, had resolved their
debts, or could resolve the issues that prompted their filings outside of
bankruptcy. Similarly, the court dismissed two other cases based on repre-
sentations by other parties in interest that the debtor and its creditors had
reached an agreement.186
These cases benefitted debtors and creditors who, based on debtors' dis-
closure statements, had reached a negotiating impasse or faced other obsta-
cles solved by bankruptcy. Debtors' desire to save real property crucial to
their operations from foreclosure prompted most of these filings.' 8 7 Chapter
11 provided them an opportunity to negotiate productively with their creditors
or find alternate financing, often keeping their church buildings and other
property. The religious organizations may not have achieved these outcomes
absent bankruptcy protection.
For example, Union for Traditional Judaism filed under Chapter 11 be-
cause ongoing litigation with an alleged tenant had prevented it from selling
property no longer necessary to its mission. It needed to sell the property
182. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
183. See Success of Chapter 11, supra note 19, at 618-19 (discussing why a debt-
or may not have proposed a plan).
184. See supra Table 4.
185. See supra note 75.
186. See supra note 75.
187. See supra note 75.
188. Motion for Entry of Orders Approving Sale Procedures, Broker's Fee and
Break Up Fee, In Connection with the Sale of Assets Free and Clear of Liens, Claims,
Encumbrances and Interests Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105 and 363 and for Related
Relief, In re Union for Traditional Judaism, No. 10-22958 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 14,
2010), Doc. 19.
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to free up a substantial sum of cash to relieve financial pressures and pay its
creditors.189 The court granted its motion to sell approximately six months
after the petition date and dismissed its case two months later.190 Given land-
lord-tenant laws, it could not have achieved this outcome as quickly outside
of bankruptcy.' 9' As of February 2013, Union for Traditional Judaism con-
tinued to operate.' 92
As another example, Mok Yang Presbyterian Church (Mok Yang) en-
tered Chapter 11 with three creditors - one secured, and two unsecured with
claim amounts less than 0.1% of Mok Yang's total indebtedness.193 The se-
cured creditor held a $1.8 million claim on property with a scheduled value of
$4.1 million.194 Within two months of filing, Mok Yang reached a for-
bearance agreement with its secured creditor, and three months later, the
court approved the agreement and dismissed its case.' 95 From the perspective
of saving viable businesses, these cases were successes. Including these
cases, the percentage of cases that ended productively increases to 35%.
Table 6 summarizes the outcomes of the cases in the study. As with the
above discussion, it does not include cases that remained pending as of
November 2012.
189. Id.
190. Order (i) Approving Contract of Sale With Netivot Shalom, Inc. and (ii)
Authorizing Sale of Assets Free and Clear of Liens, Claims, Encumbrances and Inter-
ests, Union for Traditional Judaism, No. 10-22958 at Doc. 82; Order Signed on
1/14/2011 Granting Motion for Structured Dismissal of the Debtors' Chapter II Cas-
es, Union for Traditional Judaism, No. 10-22958, at Doc. 99.
191. The debtor's sale of the property under 11 U.S.C. § 363 allowed it to dispose
of the property free and clear of the purported tenant's claims,
192. See Union for Traditional Judaism, http://www.utj.org/ (last visited Feb.
17, 2013).
193. Motion for Order (i) Approving Loan Forbearance Agreement and (ii) Ap-
proving Voluntary Dismissal of Debtor's Bankruptcy Case, In re Mokyang Presbyter-
ian Church, No. 11-18599 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Dec. 1, 2011) [hereinafter Mokyang],
Doc. 26.
194. Id.; Amended Schedules, Mokyang, No. 11-18599, at Doc. 20.
195. Order Granting Motion for Approval of Agreement and Dismissing Case,
Mokyang, No. 11-18599, at Doc. 32.
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Table 6: Outcomes of Religious Organization Debtors' Cases
N %
Reorganization Plan Proposed, Confirmed 119 25.3
Reorganization Plan Proposed, Not Confirmed, Other Success 6 1.3
Reorganization Plan Proposed, Not Confirmed, No Other Success 68 14.4
Liquidation Plan Proposed, Confirmed 6 1.3
Liquidation Plan Proposed, Not Confirmed 0 0.0
No Plan Proposed, Dismissed, Other Success 34 7.2
No Plan Proposed, Dismissed, No Other Success 238 50.5
Total 471 100.0
The additional cases that ended productively highlight a constant across
most of the religious organizations in this study: issues with real property
prompted their filings. They had fallen behind on mortgage payments and
wanted to save their property from foreclosure. Of the cases for which I
could identify a reason for the filing, concerns about real property induced
more than 75%. 196 This result is not surprising considering that the median
faith-based institution arrived in bankruptcy holding 96% of the value of its
assets in real property, that the median organization claimed that it had an
equity cushion of 30% of the real property's value, and that 78% of the or-
ganizations asserted that their real property was worth more than what they
owed on it.197
Religious organizations' motivation to reorganize to save encumbered
property, however, is merely a symptom of underlying problems. As ex-
plored in the next Part, two main sets of circumstances lead to the financial
crises that make Chapter 11 attractive to them. First, some faith-based insti-
tutions can no longer remain current on their mortgage payments and other
debts because their members' offerings decreased dramatically during the
Great Recession. Second, a sizable portion of the membership either loses
faith in or abandons the organization in reaction to changes and failure in
leadership.' 99 The consequence of both circumstances is financially strug-
gling congregations.
Crucially, almost all of the ensuing financial problems implicate mil-
lions of dollars of real property. Therefore, religious organizations' use of
Chapter 11 may provide leaders and congregations a valuable opportunity to
negotiate with their creditors and hold onto their real estate. This distin-
guishes their cases from those of most other small businesses, and also evi-
196. 1 could not identify the reason for filing in 126 (25%) of the cases in the
study. See supra note 75.
197. N = 428. See supra Table 3.
198. See infra Part IV.A.
199. See infra Part IV.B.
756 [Vol. 78
BANKRUPTING THE FAITH
dences a use of reorganization in between the traditional view of reorganiza-
tion as preserving going-concern value and the more recent account of Chap-
ter 11 as a labor-market intervention. To explore these differences, after de-
tailing the two main explanations for religious organizations' road to bank-
ruptcy, Part IV examines what benefits Chapter 11 brought to these institu-
tions and whether bankruptcy was an effective solution to their problems.
IV. KEEPING THE FAITH
The majority of the religious organizations in this study entered Chapter
11 to save their churches, school buildings, and other real estate from foreclo-
sure.200 Drawing on the events precipitating their filings outlined in the dis-
closure statements accompanying proposed plans, Table 7 summarizes the
201primary problems faced by these institutions. Some debtors stated more
than one precipitator. Table 7 includes all major reasons a debtor provided
when discussing why it filed. It shows that the two primary precipitators of
filings were declines in revenue because of the economic downturn and issues
with leadership. In addition to the departure, sickness, or death of a religious
leader, attrition in membership (often because of disagreements with practic-
es), careless administration of the organization, and over-expansion generally
202
were attributed to religious leaders. Pastors and other leaders also usually
had a hand in problems with construction (mainly delays) and failed negotia-
tions with lenders. The "other" category is varied, though damage from dis-
asters, such as Hurricane Katrina, was mentioned by at least half a dozen
debtors, and others blamed their financial declines on the loss of government
licenses or the closing of programs like Head Start. Those debtors with un-
clear statements regarding the reasons for their arrival in bankruptcy largely
203
appear to have filed in reaction to problems paying mortgages.
200. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
201. Except for issues negotiating with lenders, Table 7 does not include debtors'
overriding concern about problems with real property. Almost all of the debtors cited
impending foreclosure as a precipitating event. See supra note 196 and accompany-
ing text. Because the debtor must discuss the history of its business and the events
precipitating its Chapter II filing in the disclosure statement accompanying its plan,
including only those debtors that filed plans provides a more accurate, albeit selective,
summary of their difficulties. See In re Malek, 35 B.R. 443 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983)
(discussing what information must be included in a disclosure statement). I sought
only to categorize events that were clearly stated in the debtors' filings. The rather
large "unclear" category reflects this conservatism in categorizing events. See also
supra note 167.
202. For example, lax running includes incurring debts the congregation cannot
service, not paying taxes, and hiring employees that do not perform satisfactorily.
203. Most debtors that filed a plan also filed a disclosure statement, either sepa-
rately or as part of the plan. The limited number of debtors that only filed a plan is
reflected in the "unclear" frequency because plans alone do not discuss the events
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Table 7: Main Precipitators of Filing, Religious Organization
Debtors' Cases with Plans
Plan Plan
N Confirmed Pending
Decline In Revenue Due To Economy 52 28 3
Problems with Construction 29 14 1
Unclear 29 14 1
Failed Negotiations with Lender 27 14 1
Other 24 14 1
Litigation 22 15 2
Lax Running 19 12 3
Other Decline in Membership 16 8 1
Religious Leader Left, Sick, or Died 14 9 1
Loss of Faith in Leader/Leader Impropriety 14 13 0
Sell Real Property 8 2 1
Over-expanded 6 5 0
As evident from the stories of Crystal Cathedral Ministries and Ark of
Safety described in Part 1, many religious organizations experience a
confluence of these precipitators before they file for bankruptcy. The follow-
ing subparts detail a selection of these institutions' cases as representative
examples of exactly when and why religious organizations are drawn
to Chapter 11 and whether bankruptcy offers a productive solution to their
financial problems.
A. Coping During the Great Recession
The economic downturn exacerbated both Crystal Cathedral Ministries'
and Ark of Safety's difficulties. The Great Recession alone affected many of
the religious organizations in this study so significantly that they believed
their only option was to seek bankruptcy protection to save their buildings
and other property. For some, the convergence of declining member contri-
butions, plummeting real property values, and a tightened lending market
rendered their congregations unsalvageable. For others, Chapter 11 offered
an opportunity to negotiate with secured creditors without the threat of an
impending foreclosure sale, and gave breathing space to formulate a plan to
remain current on restructured mortgage payments going forward.
precipitating filing. In addition, a few debtors filed disclosure statements containing
very little, if any discussion of the events leading to their filings.
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Cornerstone Baptist of Macon's (Cornerstone Baptist) case provides a
typical example of the former. Cornerstone Baptist, which owned and oper-
ated a church built in 1981 and situated on 19.4 acres, filed under Chapter 11
in 2011.204 Offerings were its primary source of income.205 The economic
downturn caused offerings to decline to the point where the church could no
longer service its debts.206 Additionally, the value of the church property had
decreased significantly in recent years, and when Cornerstone Baptist arrived
at the courthouse, it owed $750,000 on a church worth less than $475,000.207
Otherwise, it owned personal property with a $10,000 liquidation value. 208
Soon after the petition date, the bankruptcy court lifted the automatic stay on
the church property based on a lack of adequate protection. 209 Once the stay
was lifted and foreclosure ensued, the court had no real option but to dismiss
Cornerstone Baptist's case.210
Other religious organizations affected by the economic downturn arrived
in bankruptcy court with better prospects. Omega Ministries of Tyler (Ome-
ga Ministries) first encountered problems with its otherwise prosperous and
growing ministry when the recession hit.21' It completed construction on its
first church building in 2004.212 At that time, the ministry had 100 mem-
bers.213 When it filed under Chapter 11 in October 2010, it boasted nearly
250 members.214 To accommodate its growing membership between the ini-
tial church dedication and its bankruptcy filing, Omega Ministries used fi-
nancing to construct a new building.215 Unfortunately, beginning in the fall
of 2008 many of its members no longer could contribute to the church.2 16
When the construction loan matured, the bank would not extend the financ-
* 217ing. Omega Ministries could not find another lender and filed for bank-
204. Debtor's Disclosure Statement Regarding Debtor's Plan of Reorganization
Dated December 5, 2011, In re Cornerstone Baptist Church of Macon, Inc., No. 11-
51573 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. May 17, 2011), Doc. 49.
205. Id
206. Id
207. Id
208. Id
209. Consent Order Granting Motion For Relief From Stay, Cornerstone Baptist,
No. 11-51573, at Doc. 76.
210. Order Granting Motion to Dismiss Case, Cornerstone Baptist, No. 11-51573,
at Doc. 83.
211. First Amended Disclosure Statement Dated March 30, 2011, In re Omega
Ministries of Tyler, Inc., No. 10-61086 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. Oct. 4, 2010), Doc. 68.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
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ruptcy soon after receiving a notice of foreclosure.218 However, unlike Cor-
nerstone Baptist, Omega Ministries owed less than 55% of its real estate's
market value to secured creditors.2 19 It proposed a plan that restructured
its secured debt payments and paid its unsecured creditors 100% of their
claims over six years.220 The bankruptcy court confirmed its plan, and about
221
a year later issued a final decree. As of February 2013, Omega Ministries
seemed to have weathered its financial difficulties and was operating in its
new, larger building.222
Omega Ministries' story of a combined decrease in contributions from
members, problems negotiating with a major secured creditor, and inoppor-
tunely timed expansion echoes that of many religious organizations severely
affected by the economic downturn. Particularly salient are difficulties with
223
mortgage holders. Among troublesome secured lenders, Evangelical
Christian Credit Union (ECCU) features prominently. ECCU provides bank-
224~ing and other financial services to nearly 2,000 evangelical ministries, m-
cluding offering construction loans that do not require personal guarantees.225
Reflecting Omega Ministries' and other religious organizations' progressions
from renting space to buying land and constructing churches or to upgrading
previously purchased buildings, ECCU's website includes a document that
details how a ministry may determine whether it is a financially sound time to
226transition from renter to owner. Almost all of these transitions are done in
the name of the religious organization as a nonprofit, and rarely do leaders
and congregants co-sign or guarantee loans.227
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Order Confirming Debtor's Fourth Amended Plan of Reorganization Dated
August 15, 2011, As Modified, Omega Ministries, No. 10-61086, at Doc. 104; Final
Decree, Omega Ministries, No. 10-61086, at Doc. 159.
222. See OMEGA MINISTRIES INTERNATIONAL, http://www.omegaministries-
international.com/omega/welcome (last visited Sep. 2, 2013).
223. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
224. Banking From A Distance, ECCU, https://www.eccu.org/about/bankingfrom-
adistance (last visited Sep. 2, 2013); Membership, ECCU, https://www.eccu.org/
about/membership (last visited Sep. 2, 2013).
225. Ministry First Construction Loan, ECCU, https://www.eccu.org/ financial-
services/financing/churchconstructionloan (last visited Sep. 2, 2013).
226. Renting versus buying your church's facility, ECCU, available at
https://www.eccu.org/assets/whitepaperpages/9/pdfs.pdf.
227. Not all religious organizations purchased real property solely in their names.
For example, Greater Mount Zion Christian Church purchased its real estate in the
name of Greater Mount Zion and its appointed reverend as tenants in common, and
some of its initial members co-signed the loan. Disclosure Statement of July 27, 2007,
In re Greater Mount Zion Christian Church, No. 07-00925 (Bankr. E.D. N.C. Mar. 14,
2007) at Doc. 45 [hereinafter Disclosure Statement of July 27, 2007]. However, these
stories seem to be outliers; co-signing and tenancy in common were not mentioned in
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For example, ECCU provided a loan to Christian Love Fellowship Min-
istries (Christian Love), which was organized in 1981 under the leadership of
Pastor Hill, who conducted the first services at an activity center on the Uni-
versity of Michigan's campus.228 Christian Love did not own any real prop-
erty until 1994, when it, as a nonprofit corporation, purchased the land on
229
which it continues to operate. Over the years, it improved and expanded
230the buildings on the land. In 2007, it dedicated its 30,000 square foot facil-
ity, which can seat 1,500 people and contains administrative offices, a nurse-
ry, and a library.231 Christian Love filed solely because it was unable to meet
the monthly payments on its building's mortgage when its 600 congregants'
donations declined sharply during the economic downturn. 232 It previously
had entered into a forbearance agreement with ECCU, but the expanded
building decreased in value and ECCU was unwilling to renew the agree-
ment.233 Christian Love's filing halted ECCU's pre-bankruptcy negotiating
tactics. The court confirmed its proposed reorganization plan that restruc-
tured the mortgage, including leaving ECCU with an unsecured deficiency
claim larger than its secured claim, and paid its unsecured creditors 7% on
234their claims. As of February 2013, Christian Love continued to hold ser-
235
vices in the same building that led it to bankruptcy.
ECCU refused to negotiate with a number of other churches in this
236
study, at least according to the debtors. As with Cornerstone Baptist, some
of these congregations arrived with prospects so dire that bankruptcy's tem-
porary halt of collection activities and altering of negotiating dynamics could
other disclosure statements. See, e.g., Third Amended Combined Plan and Disclosure
Statement of Christian Love Fellowship Ministries, International, In re Christian Love
Fellowship Ministries International, No. 10-74467 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Nov. 12, 2010)
[hereinafter Christian Love], Doc. 88; Disclosure Statement of July 27, 2007, Greater
Mount Zion, No. 07-00925, at Doc. 45.
228. Third Amended Combined Plan and Disclosure Statement of Christian Love
Fellowship Ministries, International, Christian Love, No. 10-74467, at Doc. 88.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.; Order Confirming Third Amended Combined Plan and Disclosure
Statement of Christian Love Fellowship Ministries, International, Christian Love, No.
10-74467, at Doc. 98.
235. See CHRISTIAN LOVE FELLOWSHIP INT'L, http://www.clfmi.org/ (last visited
Sep. 2, 2013).
236. This may have been a sound tactic. Other finance companies catering to
churches have not fared as well as ECCU in the face of the economic downturn. For
example, Church Mortgage and Loan Corporation, a nonprofit corporation that issued
mortgages to faith-based institutions, filed under Chapter II in 2008, sold some of its
assets, and then obtained confirmation of its liquidation plan. See generally Church
Mortgage, supra note 81.
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not save them.237 Like Christian Love, others succeeded in preventing their
property from being foreclosed on by ECCU.
Still other faith-based institutions weathered the economic downturn by
using bankruptcy to sell property hindering their post-recession financial pro-
spects. These debtors entered Chapter 11 with the goals of controlling the
sale of their property, and then reorganizing as smaller, more efficient institu-
tions. Overall, when faced with the fallout of the economic downturn, reli-
gious organizations predominately use the Chapter 11 process to renegotiate
their secured debt, find refinancing, or sell property otherwise subject to fore-
closure. They ostensibly hope that they will be able to keep up with restruc-
tured or new mortgage payments going forward, and that contributions from
members will increase as the economy improves. If their operations are sta-
ble, it appears they should be able to pull through.
B. Resuscitating a Failing Congregation
Most striking about the cases filed in reaction to the economic downturn
is the crucial involvement of a singular leader. Though debtors told tales of
decreased contributions from members, failed negotiations with their lenders,
and plummeting real property values, weaved throughout their narratives
were references to the importance of the religious leader in keeping the insti-
tution running, even when a board of directors also oversaw the organiza-
tion's operations. The congregation was formed under the direction of the
238 . 239pastor. It thrived and grew under the pastor's supervision. The pastor
237. A more colorful example of a persistent debtor is Christ the Rock Interna-
tional, which filed twice during this study's timeframe. Its 2009 case was dismissed
for failure to retain counsel. In re Christ the Rock International, Inc., No. 09-47788
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2009). It managed to retain counsel before it filed its 2011
case, but the bankruptcy court dismissed that case on the U.S. Trustee's motion that
Christ the Rock had no hope of reorganizing. Order Dismissing Case with Notice of
Dismissal, In re Christ the Rock International, Inc., No. 11-49093 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
Oct. 27, 2011), Doc. 31. Christ the Rock stated that it filed to prevent foreclosure of
its property by ECCU. Application to Retain Dahiya Law Office, LLC As Counsel to
the Debtor, Christ the Rock, No. 11-49093, at Doc. 25. However, the U.S. Trustee's
motion reveals a complicated history of improper deeding of property and incomplete
disclosures of assets and debts. Motion to Dismiss Case, Christ the Rock, No. 11-
49093, at Doc. 29. Perhaps unsurprisingly, Christ the Rock filed for a third time in
2012. In re Christ the Rock International, Inc., No. 12-44393 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. June
14, 2012).
238. See, e.g., Disclosure Statement of July 27, 2007, supra note 227 (describing
how the church was formed); Christian Love, supra note 227 (detailing the im-
portance of the pastor and his wife).
239. See, e.g., Disclosure Statement of July 27, 2007, supra note 227 (describing
how the church was successful for many years); Christian Love, supra note 227 (de-
tailing the church's operations for thirty years).
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negotiated, albeit unsuccessfully, with the organization's lenders.24 And the
pastor made sacrifices to ensure that the ministry would continue despite the
financial circumstances. 241 These organizations' websites feature the pastor
(or similar leader) and often his spouse, highlighting how they brought their
vision to their ministry, what they believe, their personal histories, and the
"brand" they envision.242 Unsurprisingly, many of the ministries are non-
denominational, evangelical (like the churches with which ECCU does busi-
ness), or otherwise congregationalist.243 Financially, they effectively are on
their own. 24
Based on their general independence, these organizations may be
viewed as small businesses, albeit in the profession of religious ministry.
Dave Ramsey, the well-known financial advisor who encourages people to
245get out of debt, seems to view them as such. He offers a seminar called
Momentum, which teaches church leaders how to "build[] the Kingdom debt
free." 246 Momentum purports to "transform the way your church views mon-
ey and giving," to teach pastors and other leaders how to convince members
to give to the church, and to provide a path "to intentionally disciple your
church about finances."247 Testimonials emphasize the value to church lead-
ers: "Pastors and church leaders are always trying to figure out how to get
people to give 10 percent. Momentum is the first program I've seen to an-
swer that question."248 Ramsey's website also includes a "Pastor's Resource
Newsletter."249 As he appears to understand implicitly, like other small busi-
nesses, these organizations' survival depends on the leadership of their reli-
gious visionaries.250 The debtors explored in the previous subpart may be
able to weather the economic downturn once they use Chapter 11 to restruc-
240. See Christian Love, supra note 227 (detailing failed negotiations with
ECCU).
241. See Disclosure Statement of July 27, 2007, supra note 227 (describing how
the reverend would forego his salary if necessary).
242. See, e.g., OMEGA MINISTRIES INTERNATIONAL, supra note 222; see also
Thumma, supra note 101 (noting that a "congregation's identity ... is shaped around
[its pastor's] vision," and that megachurches often are "the product of one highly
gifted spiritual leader").
243. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
244. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
245. See About Dave, DAVERAMSEY.CoM, http://www.daveramsey.com/company/
about-dave/ (last visited Nov. 29, 2012).
246. Momentum: Training, DAVERAMSEY.COM, http://www.daveramsey.com/
momentum/home/ (last visited Sep. 2, 2013).
247. Id.
248. Momentum: Success Stories, DAVERAMSEY.COM, http://www.daveramsey.
com/momentum/success-stories/ (last visited Sep. 2, 2013).
249. Church Leaders, DAVERAMSEY.COM, http://www.daveramsey.com/home
page/church/ (last visited Sep. 2, 2013).
250. Momentum: Our Approach, DAVERAMSEY.cOM, http://www.daveramsey.
com/momentum/our-approach/ (last visited Sep. 2, 2013).
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ture their loans, but they likely will survive only if their members continue to
have faith in their leaders and only if those leaders do not make unsound
- - 251business decisions.
The stories of what drives the remaining majority of religious institution
debtors to file for bankruptcy confirm that the organizations' survival is tied
to certain people. When these people falter, move away, or die, the organiza-
tions suffer, sometimes to the point of having to close their doors.25 One of
the more frequent narratives is that of a beloved pastor leaving the congrega-
tion, either to pursue a new opportunity or because of a (often untimely)
death. For example, Johnson Chapel Community Church (Johnson Chapel)
purchased its current church building in 2007 after a fire destroyed its previ-
253
ous building. A subsequent decline in its financial condition that led to its
inability to service the loan on the new property primarily precipitated its
Chapter 11 filing.2 54 The lead minister separating from the church caused this
decline, which in turn resulted in a substantial reduction in its congregation's
size.255 Johnson Chapel filed shortly after the property was scheduled for
foreclosure sale.256
251. Nonetheless, particularly during economic downturns, even if a congregation
is strong, a church possibly may fail because of its leader's effectiveness. A charis-
matic leader may foster increased attendance, but a church's "business" model does
not mean that increased participation necessarily will lead to increased contributions.
Indeed, the pastor and congregation may view part of the church's purpose as provid-
ing a welcoming community for people in need, including during difficult financial
times. Thereby, a church may open its doors to new members who do not have the
resources to tithe, increasing the church's operating costs during a time when its fi-
nancial resources already are strained. A pastor's charisma could be the downfall of
the church.
252. See, e.g., Christian Life Church's Combined Plan and Disclosure Statement,
Dated May 1, 2012, In re Christian Life Church, No. 11-04192 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa
Oct. 27, 2011), Doc. 81 (noting how the pastor's death led to a decline in member-
ship); Original Disclosure Statement Describing Original Chapter 11 Plan, In re
Lighthouse Baptist Church of Columbia, No. 11-01626 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. Feb.
21, 2011), Doc. 24 (explaining how a pastor left the congregation, leading to a
decrease in membership); Second Amended Disclosure Statement, In re Prince of
Peace Baptist Church, No. 08-53352 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Sept. 17, 2008), Doc. 98
(discussing how the congregation's relationship with a pastor soured, leading to the
pastor's departure and a membership decline); First Amended Disclosure Statement in
Connection with Jennis Bowen & Brundage, P.L.'s First Amended Chapter II Plan of
Liquidation for Continuing Care, Inc., In re Continuing Care, Inc., No. 06-3838 (July
28, 2006), Doc. 221 (detailing the debtor's financial and operational decline and de-
scribing the plan of liquidation).
253. Disclosure Statement, Under 11 U.S.C. § 1125 In Support of Debtor's Plan
of Reorganization, In re Johnson Chapel Community Church, Inc., No. 08-34462
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. Sept. 2, 2008), Doc. 62.
254. Id.
255. Id
256. Id.
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During its case, Johnson Chapel sold a vacant lot near the site of its pre-
vious church building. Interestingly, it marketed the lot to other churches and
community organizations, and ultimately sold it to another church.257 John-
son Chapel used the proceeds of the sale to pay administrative expenses and
fund its reorganization plan.258 Its case culminated with the confirmation of
its plan, which primarily restructured the loan on its current property,259
where it continued to operate as of February 2013.260 Key to its continued
operation was the addition of a new pastor to lead the ministry, which revital-
ized the church and brought a significant number of new members. 26 1
There is a distinct possibility that Johnson Chapel's new pastor left a
not-so-fortunate church in his wake. Though some churches similarly con-
firm reorganization plans or negotiate successfully with creditors after suffer-
ing a key pastor's departure or death, other ministries that lost their leaders
were unable to recover.262 Like Johnson Chapel, churches that remain opera-
tive seem to survive because another leader revives the congregation.263
257. Motion for Authority to Sell Property of the Estate (Vacant, Unencumbered
Lot) Free and Clear of All Liens, Claims, and Encumbrances and for Related Relief,
Johnson Chapel, No. 08-34462, at Doc. 39.
258. Disclosure Statement, Under 11 U.S.C. § 1125 In Support of Debtor's Plan
of Reorganization, supra note 253.
259. Order Confirming Debtor's Chapter 11 Plan, Johnson Chapel, No. 08-34462,
at Doc. 95. The court issued a final decree approximately 8 months later. Final De-
cree, Johnson Chapel, No. 08-34462, at Doc. 140.
260. See Johnson Chapel Community, STREAMING FAITH http://www.streaming
faith.com/Johnson-Chapel-Community/ (last visited Oct. 22, 2013).
261. Disclosure Statement, Under II U.S.C. § 1125 In Support of Debtor's Plan
of Reorganization, supra note 253.
262. For example, Pastor Watson started Abundant Life Ministries in 1984 with
ten people meeting in a friend's basement. In 2004, he passed away unexpectedly.
Though his wife tried to continue his ministry, the church no longer brought in
enough money to service its mortgage, and Abundant Life filed to prevent foreclosure
of its worship center. It proposed a reorganization plan, but could not keep up
with adequate protection payments to its lender during its case. The court lifted the
stay, and Abundant Life sold its worship center, after which the court dismissed its
case. See generally In re Abundant Life Ministries, No. 08-5315 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
Mar. 6, 2008).
263. See, e.g., Vision for Soul Outreach Center Church, Inc.'s Second Amended
Disclosure Statement, In re Vision for Soul Outreach Ctr. Church, Inc., No. 09-67626
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. Mar. 25, 2009), Doc. 77 (detailing how a pastor founded and built
the church, and how a popular assistant pastor left the church, leading to a loss of
membership that the remaining lead pastor was working to redress); Plan of Reorgan-
ization with Combined Disclosure Statement for the Church of Omaha, a United Pen-
tecostal Church, Inc., In re The Church Of Omaha, A United Pentecostal Church,
Inc., No. 11-83138 (Bankr. D. Neb. Dec. 29, 2011), Doc. 18 (stating that the church
"suffered an acute and extremely detrimental financial impact when the immediate
prior Pastor abruptly left the Church taking approximately fifty members from the
congregation .... Pastor Myron Powell [the new pastor] had the duty of rebuilding
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As prominent among the narratives of religious organizations' financial
deterioration is congregants' reactions to key leaders' decisions and, often,
improprieties. Springfield Missionary Baptist Church's (Springfield Mis-
sionary) bishop of ten years incurred debts that the church could not service,
and purportedly expropriated funds for non-church purposes.264 He also
failed to maintain liability insurance on the church's property.265 When a
congregant who allegedly sustained injuries on the property filed a lawsuit
and obtained a default judgment, the church could not pay and the congregant
threatened to enforce her judgment lien.266 Springfield Missionary forthright-
ly confessed that it could not recover from the bishop, as he was
incarcerated.267 Its best option was to propose a plan that called for the sale
of property to satisfy the lien.268 The court confirmed the plan and issued a
final decree.269 It is unclear whether Springfield Missionary survived, but it
270lost its building.
Even if they have their congregants' support, some leaders basically run
the organization into the ground. Like any other business, churches need cash
inflow greater than current expenses to survive, which requires not only con-
tributing members, but also not being bogged down by ancillary activities that
may have seemed interesting and harmless during better times. As a final
example, Christian Life Missionary Baptist Church was formed in 1979. 271
As the years passed, it opened a restaurant, a car wash, and a snow cone
272
stand, and made various real estate investments. It also entered into leases
for computers and other equipment beyond its needs. 2 73 Then - further re-
flecting debtors' reliance on their leaders - its pastor's wife died, causing
"turmoil" in the congregation. 27 4 After it filed for bankruptcy, it abandoned
the congregation and thereby rebuilding sources of income through tithing during
tough economic times").
264. Disclosure Statement for the Plan of Reorganization Proposed By Debtor at
3, In re Springfield Missionary Baptist Church, Inc., No. 11-10474 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 7, 2011) Doc. 85.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Order of Final Decree, Springfield Missionary, No. 11-10474, at Doc. 74.
270. Order Confirming Chapter 11 Plan, Springfield Missionary, No. 11-10474, at
Doc. 57; Order of Final Decree, supra note 269.
271. Disclosure Statement of Christian Life Missionary Baptist Church, In re
Christian Life Missionary Baptist Church, No. 06-12115 (Bankr. W.D. Ok. Aug. 24,
2006), Doc. 85.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id.
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or sold all of those outside businesses, and a year later confirmed a plan that
paid its unsecured creditors 100% on their claims.275
Following the loss of a leader or a leader's poor decisions, the remaining
members must revitalize the congregation. They search for a new pastor or
work with the existing pastor to restructure the organization so that it can
generate sufficient revenue to cover expenses - most importantly, mortgage
payments restructured in reorganization plans. Like congregations recovering
from the economic downturn, the actions (and sometimes sacrifices) of a key
pastor or reverend are crucial. If members find a new leader, or if the exist-
ing leader can restore his members' confidence, the organization may survive.
Nonetheless, despite the centrality of a pastor or other leader, the continuation
of the congregation in a particular space itself often appears to motivate the
religious organization's Chapter 11 filing.
C. Benefits of Chapter 11
Across both sets of examples, and apparent in almost all of the cases in
this study, the end goal is to keep a long-lasting congregation alive and to
allow members to worship and attend daycare and school in the same space
that they have gathered in for years. In some instances, this allows the pastor
to retain the ministry he founded or built. As evident in their stories, many of
276these organizations operate for decades before filing. During that time, the
lives of their members seem to become intertwined with the institutions'
buildings. Similar to the reason people want to remain in their homes, 277 or
the reason some college students have trouble coping with their parents' sales
of their childhood homes, 278 congregants' memories and feelings of safety
and stability are tied to the physical space of their churches.279 And like con-
275. Id.; Order Confirming Plan, Christian Life, No. 06-12115, at Doe. 100.
276. See supra Table 3.
277. See Elizabeth Warren, The Economics of Race: When Making it to the Mid-
dle Is Not Enough, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1777, 1787 (2004) ("For most middle
class Americans, both social and economic life center around the home. . . . Over
time, homes become repositories of the families' collective memories, serving as a
silent reminder of the children who grew up and the adults who aged in these
rooms.").
278. See Daniel M. Warner, No Place of Grace: Recognizing Damages for Loss of
Home-Place, 8 WIS. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 41 (2002) ("[I]t can be traumatizing for a young
person to see his parents suddenly decide to sell the family home. It's almost impossi-
ble to explain the emotional significance of home.. . . Home has a resonance that is so
strong with people. Home is heart and safety and love and warmth. . . . Why is it so
traumatic? Because the family home is a symbol of stability for young people going
through their own 'rite of passage."').
279. In the context of eminent domain, the values of residential homes and church
buildings have been likened to one another. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New
London, 545 U.S. 469, 500-01 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("[A]ny single-
family home .. . might be razed to make way for an apartment building, or any church
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sumer debtors who file bankruptcy under Chapter 13 in an attempt to preserve
cherished family homes, 280 religious organizations foremost seem to file to
hold onto the "spiritual homes" to which they are psychologically attached.
If they lose their real property, whether the congregants will reassemble
in a different building in a location in the same community is unclear.28'
Regardless, religious organizations' descriptions of the effort they invest in
creating their "spiritual homes" evince that, at the moment they file for bank-
ruptcy, they are fighting to keep the buildings they currently have. This
struggle transcends merely retaining real property to preserve the organiza-
tions' equity cushions.282 Though Chapter 11 affords faith-based institutions
breathing space from creditors' collection efforts while the institutions assess
their operations or find a new pastor,283 perhaps most importantly it changes
negotiating dynamics with their secured creditors.
Indeed, because the institutions emphasize keeping real property safe
from one or two foreclosing secured creditors to whom they owe a majority
of their debts,284 their cases resemble single-asset real estate (SARE) cases.
Religious organization debtors have a median of two secured creditors, which
includes creditors with consensual liens on automobiles, have a median of
only four unsecured creditors, and on average owe 83% of their debts to cred-
... might be replaced with a retail store."); see also Rita M. Hammer, The Lived Ex-
perience of Being at Home: A Phenomenological Investigation, 25 J. OF
GERONTOLOGICAL NURSING 10, 14 (1999) ("Home involves a sense of place, a lived
space that has significance for an individual as an essential aspect of human experi-
ence. . . . It implies profound psychosocial involvement. . . . Individuals' sense of
personal and cultural identity is entwined intimately with their sense of place identity;
thus, loss of home or losing one's place is a crisis involving identity."); Stephanie M.
Stern, Residential Protectionism and the Legal Mythology of Home, 107 MICH. L.
REV. 1093, 1128 (2009) (referencing conceptions of "the affective meaning of home
as social belonging, nurturance, and biography" and noting that legal literature often
views the home as "psychologically sacrosanct").
280. See Katherine Porter, The Pretend Solution: An Empirical Study of
Bankruptcy Outcomes, 90 TEX. L. REV. 103, 111-12 (2011) ("The data show that
participating families had two major goals in filing Chapter 13: to keep their
homes, and to reduce personal and family stress by gaining control over their
financial circumstances.").
281. See Hammer, supra note 279, at 14.
282. This difference may implicate how the "theory of the firm" may apply to
religious organizations, further indicating that extending the results of this study to
theories regarding the organization of religious institution and nonprofits is an area
ripe for future work. See supra note 45.
283. See supra notes 66 and 69.
284. See supra Table 3 (reporting that the religious organization debtors in this
study have a median of two secured creditors, which includes creditors with consen-
sual liens on automobiles, and that the organizations on average owe 83% of their
debts to creditors secured by real property).
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itors secured by real property.285 Faith-based institutions conduct "substantial
business" in their real property - that is, the "business" of ministering - other
than operating the property, and thus technically they are not SAREs.286
Nonetheless, as with SARE cases, allowing these religious organizations to
file under Chapter 11 may be criticized as counter-productive because their
effectively two-party disputes should be handled outside of bankruptcy
through state foreclosure processes.287 The "common pool problem" typical-
ly associated with the benefits of reorganization is not present.288 Rather,
resolving the organizations' disputes with their one or two secured creditors
in bankruptcy may impose costs and delays on these creditors, resulting in
higher interest rates and fewer mortgage loan approvals in the future.289
However, the faith-based institutions' reorganizations appear to serve a
purpose and create a public benefit. Their reorganizations produce many of
the same benefits that the reorganizations of SAREs are argued to create. 290
Permitting SAREs to reorganize under the Bankruptcy Code is thought
to smooth market inefficiencies and turbulence, particularly during economic
downturns, thereby stymying the downward spiral in real property values
285. See supra Table 3.
286. The Code defines a "single asset real estate" case as a case involving "real
property constituting a single property or project .. . which generates substantially all
of the gross income of a debtor who is not a family farmer, and on which no substan-
tial business is being conducted by a debtor other than the business of operating the
real property and activities incidental hereto." 11 U.S.C. § 101(51B) (2012).
BAPCPA revised and added provisions affecting SARE cases. See Richard Levin and
Alesia Ranney-Marinelli, The Creeping Repeal of Chapter 11: The Significant Busi-
ness of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 79
AM. BANKR. L.J. 603, 641-42 (2005) (summarizing BAPCPA's provisions affecting
SARE cases).
287. See Kenneth N. Klee, One Size Fits Some: Single Asset Real Estate Bank-
ruptcy Cases, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1285, 1296 (2002) (summarizing arguments
against allowing SARE cases to reorganize under Chapter 11); Hon. Roger M.
Whelan and William W. Senft, The Legislative Response to Single Asset Real Estate
Bankruptcies: Critical Analysis and Some Suggestions, I AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV.
157, 160 (1993) ("Much of the frustration created by single asset real estate bankrupt-
cy cases arises from the secured creditor's perception that the debtor can use Chapter
II to significantly delay foreclosure proceedings without offering any compensation
for the use of collateral pending such delay.").
288. Thereby, the Chapter 11 cases of religious organizations also implicate the
creditors' bargain theory of bankruptcy, which broadly argues that bankruptcy law
should deal only with resolving financial common pool problems and maximizing
creditors' collective welfare. See Thomas H. Jackson & Robert E. Scott, On the Na-
ture of Bankruptcy: An Essay on Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditors' Bargain, 75
VA. L. REV. 155 (1989) (creating an "expanded creditors' bargain model"); Thomas
H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors' Bargain,
91 YALE L. J. 857 (1982) (setting forth the "simple creditors' bargain model").
289. See Klee, supra note 287, at 1296.
290. Id. at 1297.
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that can result from placing large amounts of foreclosed property on the
market at the same time and preventing undue concentrations of real estate
ownership in the hands of a few financial institutions.29 1 Allowing SAREs to
file under Chapter 11 also has been supported on the basis that it protects
ownership investments in real estate, especially when SARE cases involve
numerous owners who have invested in real estate.292 Others have argued for
SAREs' access to reorganization on the basis that bankruptcy courts may
make allowances for equitable, community, and other considerations in
assessing their cases. 29 3
The successful reorganizations of the faith-based institutions in this
study exhibit these benefits. As detailed in Table 7, debtors citing the loss of
faith in a pastor, the pastor's impropriety or departure, lax management, or
over-expansion as precipitating their filings succeeded in confirming a plan in
more than two-thirds of cases with proposed plans. Like Johnson Chapel and
Christian Life, these debtors found a new leader, restored the remaining
members' confidence in the current leader, fostered new membership, or
remedied past business mistakes. 2 94  Across the successful cases, these
achievements preserved the congregation and provided the institution with
sufficient revenues going forward to save real estate threatened with foreclo-
sure, protecting the congregation's investment, preventing the real estate from
being sold at a fire-sale price, and, perhaps most important to the members,
allowing the congregants to continue gathering in the same building.295
Similarly, about half of the debtors suffering from the economic down-
turn and struggling with uncooperative secured lenders confirmed reorganiza-
tion plans. As demonstrated by the cases of Omega Ministries and Christian
Love, 296 these plans prevented foreclosure, protecting the congregation and
its cherished buildings. In some instances the congregation was not savable,
291. See id. at 1297-1300; see also Richard M. Hynes, Reorganization as Re-
demption, 6 VA. L. & Bus. REV. 183, 234-35 (2011) (noting that if debtors are unable
to quickly refinance or sell assets at their actual values because of imperfect markets
or information asymmetries, this could lead to reduced creditor recovery and exces-
sive liquidation).
292. See Klee, supra note 287, at 1299-1300.
293. See id. at 1300-01; see also John D. Ayer, Symposium on Bankruptcy: Chap-
ter II Issues: Bankruptcy as an Essentially Contested Concept: The Case of the One-
Asset Case, 44 S.C. L. REV. 863, 868-90 (1993) (presenting arguments for and against
single asset real estate chapter 11 cases).
294. See supra notes 257-261, 274-275, and accompanying text.
295. See supra Parts IV.A, B. In addition, the prevention of foreclosure may in
turn prevent value decreases in neighboring residential property. See Thomas M.
Carroll, Terrance M. Clauretie & Jeff Jensen, Living Next to Godliness: Residential
Property Values and Churches, 12 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 319 (1996) (finding that
the value of residential property increases based on its proximity to a church and on
the size of the church, with larger churches tending to have a greater positive impact
on residential property values).
296. See supra notes 220-222, 233-235, and accompanying text.
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such as in Cornerstone Baptist's case. 297 But even in cases in which the debt-
or sold property, such as Springfield Missionary's, often the debtor at the
very least achieved its goal of preserving a well-established congregation. 298
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR CHAPTER 11
The standard account of the usefulness of Chapter 11 is that it preserves
going-concern value of a financially distressed business. The account focuses
299
on the deployment of assets apart from who owns them. Whether this
explanation applies to the typical small business recently has been
questioned. 300 The results of the Baird-Morrison study suggest that most
small businesses hold few assets, particularly assets idiosyncratic to their
operations or operations of businesses in their industry that are difficult to sell
or more valuable when sold or kept together. 30  Their primary asset is the
human capital of their founders. These entrepreneurs likely file for bankrupt-
cy when their skill sets do not match their ventures' current business models,
causing the businesses to fail. 302 They use Chapter 11 to gain temporary
liquidity or bargaining power over creditors, to renegotiate personally guaran-
teed debts, or for some "breathing space."303 Though their cases probably
will succeed if their human capital matches their core business models (for
example, they shed extraneous operations through their cases), spending time
in bankruptcy has the potential to tie other entrepreneurs to failing businesses
when those owner-operators simply should transition to new ventures. 304
Most importantly, this account shifts the focus from the failing business to the
failing entrepreneur. 305
The stories of the religious organization debtors detailed above straddle
the two accounts. Even those organizations that file in reaction to the
economic downturn are dependent on the overarching management of a
pastor who negotiates with secured creditors, works with tenants to ensure
rent is paid, and encourages members to give to the church despite the
297. See supra notes 208-210 and accompanying text.
298. See supra notes 268-270 and accompanying text.
299. See Baird & Morrison, supra note 22, at 2312-14 (summarizing the standard
account).
300. See id. at 2314; Systems Failure Part 2, supra note 66, at 263-65 (noting that
many small business reorganizations are dependent on owner-managers).
301. Baird & Morrison, supra note 22, at 2315.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 2315-16.
304. Id. at 2316-18; see also David S. Evans & Linda S. Leighton, Some Empiri-
cal Aspects of Entrepreneurship, 79 AM. ECON. REv. 519, 525 (1989) (explaining that
entrepreneurs with failed businesses are likely to start new businesses).
305. Baird & Morrison, supra note 22, at 2318; see also Systems Failure Part 2,
supra note 66, at 256 ("Many of the businesses studied were small enough that their
survival depended on the continued involvement of an owner-manager. . . .").
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desperate economic situation. Otherwise, the institutions generally rise or fall
with leaders who connect with their congregations. If an instrumental leader
leaves or dies, the remaining members have to find a suitable replacement if
the congregation is to survive. Likewise, if a pastor makes business or life
mistakes and stays with his congregation, his actions going forward to restore
members' confidence and create a workable business model are most
instrumental to the institution's continued existence. Given that these institu-
tions exhibit many of the hallmarks and financial structures of small busi-
nesses, it is unsurprising that an individual or small group of individuals drive
their success. And, as detailed in Part IV, the stories of why they seek bank-
ruptcy protection mirror some of the reasons small businesses file under
Chapter 1306
However, the religious organizations differ from the typical small busi-
ness debtor in three important and interrelated respects. First, they have op-
erated on average three times longer than the average small business debt-
or.307 Second, they own assets of considerable value apart from their leaders'
ability to energize a congregation. In particular, they own real property worth
millions of dollars. 30 Basically, they own large buildings or campuses.309
These buildings often are constructed for the needs of the congregation. Like
Christian Love's expanded building, they include administrative offices,
sanctuaries, libraries, nurseries, daycare and school areas, and other worship-
related build-outs.3o Essentially, they look like churches. As evidenced by
Johnson Chapel's case, limited buyers for these buildings may exist.311 Ac-
cordingly, the market for their real property most likely is tighter than the
market for other real estate, such as residential real property. The buildings
likely are best marketed to other religious and community-based organiza-
tions. Moreover, at least according to their representations, debtors often
hold an equity cushion in their real estate.312 This equity cushion becomes
important when their secured creditors threaten to sell the property via fore-
closure because the debtors may lose their financial investments if the build-
ings and land are sold for less than market prices. Of course, if the real estate
is sold, congregations also will lose property of great emotional value.3 13
Third, the nonprofit corporation owns those assets, and the corpor-
ation is the sole obligor on any secured debt encumbering the assets. 314
306. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
307. See supra Table 3, notes 122-123, and accompanying text.
308. See supra Table 3.
309. See supra Table 3.
310. See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
311. See supra note 257 and accompanying text.
312. See supra Figure 2. But see supra note 107 regarding debtors' incentive to
inflate the reported values of their assets.
313. See supra notes 277-281 and accompanying text.
314. See supra note 76 regarding evidence in debtors' disclosure statements as to
personal guarantees.
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Leaders and key members at one point may have held a financial stake in the
organization or served as guarantors, but by the time they acquire their land
and construct their church, the real property is generally solely in the name of
the church.315
Considered together, religious organizations enter Chapter 11 in differ-
ent financial and bargaining circumstances than the typical small business
debtor. Chapter II provides them with a venue to work with their secured
creditors to save property that is both financially and emotionally valuable to
them and perhaps difficult to sell. True, like an entrepreneur, the pastor (or
congregants) could shut down the ministry and try again, starting from
scratch and gathering in rented space in a community center or a building
owned by a different church. Such a transition may be beneficial. It may
allow for shifts in leadership, relieve internal strife, or remedy over-expansion
or lax management. But the years of work it took to build an organization
capable of purchasing and servicing a building, the specificity of that property
to religious and community organizations, and the congregation's desire to
remain in a particular building, make their Chapter 11 cases more of an effort
to save going-concern value than typical small business debtors' cases.
In this context, the effort seems worthwhile, even when balancing the
costs of bankruptcy to creditors and to the pastors and congregations that
perhaps should start over. Assuming the market for their property is illiquid,
particularly given the recent recession, that property is more valuable to the
debtor or other businesses in the religious and community services industries.
As to the debtor, this is especially true if it holds equity in the property. A
foreclosure sale will generate less money, possibly not enough to return any
of that equity to the religious organization. Secured creditors also should
have an incentive to negotiate a restructured loan for similar reasons, such as
wanting to avoid the frustration and value loss of the foreclosure process. In
light of this, it is unclear why lenders like ECCU employ negotiating tactics
that push religious organizations to declare bankruptcy. Perhaps the debtors
in this study are outliers that refused to yield to ECCU's demands. Regard-
less, bankruptcy provides an avenue to remedy whatever is preventing the
faith-based institution and its secured creditors from being successful at the
bargaining table. 316
In fact, religious organizations seem to be sorting themselves into Chap-
ter 11 when it makes most sense. Only 3% (fifteen) of debtors in the study
317
own $100,000 or less in assets. These debtors may enter Chapter 11 in
similar positions as the typical small business debtor, and thus may be en-
couraged by the bankruptcy process to continue operating their organizations
315. See supra note 225 and accompanying text.
316. As an example, Chapter 11 may allow a lender to confirm the value of the
organization's assets. See Baird & Morrison, supra note 22, at 2316.
317. See supra note 75.
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longer than is economically efficient.3 18 However, considering that only 4%
of the debtors that proposed plans did not own any real property, the chances
of a bankruptcy court encountering a faith-based institution debtor with the
potential to reorganize but without real property is slim.319 Rather, courts
primarily see solvent religious organizations with a median of $1.2 million in
real property.320 There is value to be saved beyond leaders' relationships
with members.
The results of this study demonstrate that religious organizations,
viewed as a group, enter Chapter 11 with specific assets and reorganization
prospects that can make the process valuable to them and their creditors.
These effectively small businesses exhibit similar organizational focus on a
single leader or group of leaders as other small entrepreneurships. However,
by the time they arrive in bankruptcy court they have operated longer and
have accumulated more assets that are more specific to their operations than
the typical small business debtor. As with other small business debtors, bank-
ruptcy courts need to focus their attention on the leader's ability to marshal
his organization through the turmoil that led it to bankruptcy when assessing
the debtor's ability to reorganize, possibly more so than they need to in regard
to the operators of large companies that file under Chapter 11. Nonetheless,
also focusing on the deployment and value of the assets owned by the corpo-
rate entity is crucial. Moreover, the members of the religious organization
themselves have the ability to revitalize a failing congregation, provided that
they can find an acceptable leader or renew each other's faith in the pastor.
Thus where an entrepreneur may fail for lack of a workable business model
or customers, a religious organization may succeed with the help of reorgani-
zation essentially because of its customers - that is, its members - and their
commitment to sustaining their religious community in the building in which
the congregation has gathered for many years.
Religious institution debtors present a variation of the story of the usual
small business debtor, one in which the leader has an opportunity to preserve
value owned by the corporate entity and threatened by secured creditors. The
organization, as a distinct entity, is important, but so is an understanding of
the leader beyond his role as a manager and the vision of the organization's
members. In these instances, a modified view of Chapter 11 is necessary.
Both the leaders and the value housed in the corporate entity must be consid-
ered in combination to identify those faith-based institutions for which Chap-
ter 11 reorganization is a value-adding process. Once bankruptcy courts iden-
tify these organizations, the results of this study suggest that courts generally
321
will dismiss the remaining nonviable cases relatively quickly.
318. See supra notes 71 and 74.
319. See supra note 75.
320. See supra Figure 2 and Table 3.
321. See supra Part III.A.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Debates about Chapter 11 have focused on the efficiency of bankruptcy
courts in processing cases and dealing with parties with diverging interests,
and its effect on particular businesses and entrepreneurs. This study confirms
previous findings suggesting that courts process cases quickly while moderat-
ing among interested parties, and shows that a greater percentage of debtors
may confirm and consummate plans than historically assumed. The results
further indicate a need for additional research into how bankruptcy courts
assess proposed plans.
Turning to Chapter Il's effect on businesses and entrepreneurs, the cas-
es of the religious organization debtors investigated in this study reveal an
intertwining of corporate entity and leadership distinct from that of large
companies and typical small business debtors. The faith-based institutions
have hallmarks of asset specificity 322 and entrepreneurial-like leadership that
require focusing on both deployment of assets and the leadership's ability to
restore the financial stability of a congregation when assessing Chapter I1's
benefits and costs. In some situations, allowing a leader who is mismatched
with his members to remain with his ministry, or allowing a congregation to
stay together and worship in the same building it has owned for years while it
works to revive the congregation, may be productive in the long-term. Given
that religious organizations generally arrive in bankruptcy court with valuable
real property that they are intent on retaining, despite short-term delays in
more economical deployment of its leader's and congregants' resources,
Chapter 11 may produce greater overall benefits than costs.
In other situations, the leader's failures or the inability of the remaining
members to rebuild a shattered congregation absent a crucial leader may ren-
der the costs of Chapter II higher than the benefits of reorganization. 323 In-
deed, the costs may be higher even if the religious institution owns property
of significant value and possibly even if the organization asserts that it only
filed because of the effects of the economic downturn. Across all religious
organization debtors, the valuable real property the organization owns, the
leadership, and the congregants must be considered in assessing its Chapter
11 case.
The differences between religious organization debtors and typical small
business debtors discovered in this study may be unique to the faith-based
institutions that seek to reorganize. However, there may be other industries
with small businesses that survive long enough to accumulate real property
and other illiquid assets. Once identified, these cases should be approached
with a similar dual assessment of whether the entrepreneur's skill set matches
322. Assets are termed specific when they are idiosyncratic to the needs of a cer-
tain business or businesses in a particular industry. See Baird & Morrison, supra note
22, at 2330-31 (discussing asset specificity and its relation to theories of Chapter 11).
323. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
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the organization's business plan and whether it is economically feasible to
preserve the value of the assets amassed by the entrepreneur on behalf of the
business through reorganization.
The cases in this study support the validity of recent challenges to the
traditional focal point of business reorganization on preserving going-concern
value. But they also confirm a continued need to focus on the assets owned
by the debtor in some small business reorganizations, even if only in the cases
of religious institutions. As evidenced by the successful reorganizations and
continued operations of some of the debtors in this study, Chapter 11 can
provide religious institutions with a productive means to revive their
congregations following economic downturns, transitions and failures in
leadership, and problems negotiating with secured creditors, thereby allowing
their members to continue worshiping in the same space they have gathered
in for decades.
